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ABSTRACT
FACULTY OF LAW, ARTS & SOCIAL SCIENCES
DIVISION OF ECONOMICS, SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
Doctor of Philosophy
Essays on Migration
and Labour Markets
by Corrado Giulietti
This thesis explores the relationships between immigration and labour mar-
kets. The work consists of three empirical papers that examine particular aspects
of this relationship.
The first paper investigates the hypothesis that immigrants are attracted by a
particular labour market institution, the minimum wage. The empirical analysis
is implemented by assessing the impact that an exogenous increase in the federal
USA minimum wage has on the immigration flows of low-skilled individuals. The
main findings are that low-wage workers move to States where the growth of the
minimum wage is larger, while high-wage individuals are insensitive to the policy.
The second paper analyses the effects of immigration in the host labour market,
in particular on the mobility of previous residents. The main objective is to
investigate if inflows of recent immigrants determine an out-migration of natives
and earlier immigrants. This is achieved by analysing patterns of internal mi-
gration using information on the local authority of origin and destination and
on the skill level of individuals. The analysis demonstrates that, while UK-born
individuals and recent immigrants move to similar locations, earlier immigrants
are instead displaced, suggesting closer substitutability with the newcomers.
The impact of ethnic networks on employment outcomes is the final topic of the
thesis. The important feature of this study is to examine this effect separately
for immigrants and natives. This is achieved by analysing detailed data on ethnic
enclaves from two Censuses of England and Wales, which are used to construct
an index that captures local interactions. The results show that, for the majority
of immigrant groups, a larger informal network is associated with higher employ-
ment probabilities. For the group of natives, there is no evidence that living in
an enclave is detrimental to employment, and the effect is, at worst, zero.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The aim of this thesis is to explore the relationships between immigration
and labour markets.
Three main areas are covered in this research: the investigation of pulling factors
of migration, i.e., the economic drivers that attract immigrants into the coun-
try; the analysis of the impact of immigration, i.e., the consequences in terms of
labour market outcomes for individuals who live in the destination country; the
analysis of assimilation, i.e., the process through which outcomes of immigrants
converge to those of natives.
The first empirical analysis investigates the role of the minimum wage as a pulling
factor for immigration. The aim of this study is to understand how a labour mar-
ket institution in the host country can affect choices of potential immigrants and
lead them to migrate. To this end, a simple theoretical framework is presented
whereby inflows of immigrants are expressed as a function of the expected wage
growth consequent to the minimum wage increase. An econometric specification
is derived to empirically investigate the hypothesis that an increase in the mini-
mum wage affects the inflow rate of low-wage immigrants. The analysis focuses
on the USA federal minimum wage increase that took place between 1996 and
1997, and uses State data from the Current Population Survey and the Census.
The estimation is carried out in two stages: first, the growth of expected wages
is instrumented by the fraction of workers who earn between the new and the old
minimum wage; second, the predicted value is used to estimate the change in im-
migration flows. The findings show that the 20% increase in the federal minimum
wage led to a substantial increase in the expected wages of immigrants. States
1
Chapter 1. Introduction
where the growth of expected wages was relatively large (about 20%) exhibit in-
flow rate increases that are four to five times larger than States where the growth
of the expected wages was smaller (about 10%). Placebo tests demonstrate that
the policy did not affect immigration of workers who already earn wages above
minimum.
After having explored what the drivers of migration are, an important question is
to understand how these immigration flows impact on the host country. Migra-
tion can impact directly wages and employment outcomes of previous residents,
but can also generate indirect consequences if individuals are induced to move
out of the local labour market. The second empirical analysis investigates this
hypothesis in the context of the local authority districts of England and Wales.
To analyse the impact of immigration, a theoretical framework in which natives
and immigrants are imperfect substitutes is adopted. The econometric analysis
shows that immigration does not displace native working-age population; in-
stead, flows of natives are complementary with those of new immigrants. There
is evidence of displacement for earlier immigrants, with a substantial impact for
those with no or low qualifications. Robustness tests are provided to validate the
results.
Upon arrival in the country, immigrants face difficulties with adapting to the
local culture, learning a foreign language and, more generally, interacting with
other groups. In this context, immigrants usually rely on social networks, which
protect them from discrimination and make the immigrant experience less trau-
matic. The third empirical analysis is interested in studying the effect that such
networks, mainly composed of friends and relatives, have on the probability of be-
ing employed. A measure that captures local interactions is derived using detailed
data from two Censuses of England and Wales. The impact on employment is
analysed separately for immigrants and natives, and for females and males. The
results show that most immigrant groups benefit from living in an enclave and
the use of a larger informal network is associated with higher employment prob-
abilities. For the group of natives, there is no evidence that living in an enclave
is detrimental to employment, and the effect is, at worst, zero. Moreover, there
are important differences across ethnic groups and between males and females.
The thesis is organised as follows: minimum wage and migration are studied in
Chapter 2 while the “displacement” hypothesis is tested in Chapter 3; Chapter
4 analyses the relationship between ethnic networks and employment outcomes.
Discussion of main results and final remarks conclude the thesis.
2
Chapter 2
Is the Minimum Wage a Pulling
Factor for Migrants?
2.1 Introduction
Does an increase of the minimum wage constitute a pulling factor for low-
skilled immigrants? A minimum wage set in the receiving country has ambiguous
effects on immigration: on the one hand, average wages will increase, but on the
other, employment perspectives might be adversely affected. The objective of
this Chapter is to explore empirically this question in the context of the increase
in the USA federal minimum wage that took place between 1996 and 1997.
There is extensive research about the determinants of immigration and, although
it is difficult to define a taxonomy of these factors, there is a consensus that im-
migrants respond to both economic and non-economic incentives in the receiving
country. Relatively favourable employment and wage conditions, along with the
presence of network effects, distance from the origin country and immigration
policies, are indicated as principal causes of immigration (Clark et al., 2002;
Mayda, 2005). On the other hand, research on the role played by labour market
institutions, such as the minimum wage, is rather exiguous. A minimum wage
in the receiving country creates a disequilibrium in the labour market that may
encourage or deter immigration. Economic theory predicts a growth in the aver-
age wages of low-wage workers; employment effects are, however, uncertain and
depend on the labour market structure (Manning, 2003).
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In this Chapter, a simple model that relates the minimum wage to immigration
is developed and used to estimate the impact of the increase in the USA federal
minimum wage on the inflows of low-wage workers. The model postulates that
migrants take decisions in terms of expected wages, whereby the probability of
finding employment is represented by the employment population ratio in the
destination country. The change in the minimum wage has effects on the ex-
pected wages because it alters both the average wages and the probability of
employment. The effects of the policy are analysed using the change in the USA
federal minimum wage that took place between 1996 and 1997, a period during
which both minimum wage impacts and immigration flows exhibited considerable
variation across the 51 States1. The instrumental variable approach implemented
in the analysis can be efficiently explained by two steps. In the first step, the
growth of expected wages is regressed on the fraction of foreign-born individuals
who earn between the old and the new minimum wage; in the second, the pre-
dicted values are correlated with changes in the inflow rate of immigrants. The
main results show that the $0.90 top-up in the minimum wage led to an increase
in the inflow rate of low-wage immigrants that varies from less than 0.01% in
States with lower growth in expected wages to more than 0.08% in States where
expected wages grew most. The robustness of these results is tested by including
covariates for the changes in the macroeconomic conditions of each State in order
to control for confounding factors. Furthermore, placebo tests are implemented
to confirm that the growth of expected wages is not correlated with changes in
the inflow rate of immigrants that earn wages above the minimum.
The Chapter begins with a review of the studies on the minimum wage and im-
migration. The theoretical model and the econometric specification are sketched
in Sections 2.3 and 2.4. Section 2.5 provides a description of the data used in
the analysis, followed by an illustration of facts about immigration and minimum
wage. Section 2.6 presents the results of the estimation along with robustness
tests. A brief discussion of the findings and directions for future research con-
clude the Chapter.
1Including District of Columbia.
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2.2 Minimum wage and immigration
2.2.1 The effects of the minimum wage
Theories about the effects of the minimum wage are divided into two strands:
on the one side are researchers who support the classical view, which builds
upon the seminal model of Stigler (1946); on the other is a more recent litera-
ture strand known as the “new economics of the minimum wage” - named after
the influential work of Card and Krueger (1995) - which contradicts the classical
textbook framework. The core difference between the two views is the contrast-
ing prediction in terms of employment effects.
The neoclassical model predicts that, under a binding minimum wage, firms are
constrained to pay wages higher than the market clearing level and therefore
employment would be reduced to the point where the marginal revenue prod-
uct of labour equals the minimum wage. At this point, more individuals are
willing to offer their work in exchange for the minimum and this will determine
unemployment. Both wage and employment effects depend on the elasticity of
the demand and supply. Advances to the classic model of the minimum wage
date back to the 1970s, when some interesting extensions were built upon the
basic framework, such as the introduction of an uncovered sector (Welch, 1974;
Mincer, 1976). Recently, theoretical models became more structured with the
extension to heterogeneous labour, where the introduction of the minimum wage
determines a truncation of the skill distribution (Brown, 1999).
Scholars of the new economics of the minimum wage argue that firms face an
upward-sloping labour demand curve because of frictions in the labour markets.
Moderate increases in the minimum wage may thus lead to non-negative em-
ployment outcomes. Markets may be imperfect because of rigidity in the labour
turnover, presence of mobility costs, or asymmetric information (Manning, 2003).
The simplest model of imperfect competition is that of a monopsonistic labour
market, with employers having some market power in setting wages. Card and
Krueger (1995) build upon the classical monopsony framework and present a
search model in which firms offer higher wages in order to discourage turnover.
Alternative models of equilibrium wage settings have been developed, but the
general implications of such models is that employment effects are not unam-
biguously negative as predicted by the classical framework2.
2A comprehensive study is Manning (2003).
5
2.2.2 Linking minimum wage and immigration
The contrast in these theories is embodied in the empirical analyses of the mini-
mum wage, which are far from reaching consensus about the employment effects.
Most of these works focus on teenage workers, and, although the target of the
studies is always the same - the elasticity of employment with respect to the
minimum wage - the methodologies used vary substantially3. For example, Card
(1992) and Card and Krueger (1995) use the fraction of affected workers to assess
wage and employment outcomes of the minimum wage. The fraction of affected
workers is defined as the proportion of a given population that earns between the
old and the new minimum wage. Using cross-state observations from the Current
Population Survey (CPS) for the period just before and after the increase of the
minimum wage, the authors show that the fraction of affected is a valid instru-
ment to explain the “top-up” effect of the law in the average wages of teenage
workers. When used to predict changes in employment, the elasticity is in most
of the cases close to zero. Neumark and Wascher (1992) are among the first to
introduce a state-year design: using observations from the CPS for the period
between 1973 and 1989, they find negative values in the employment elasticity
for teenagers (between -0.10 and -0.20) and young adults (between -0.15 and
-0.20). The results of their fixed-effects model are robust to several alternative
specifications. Using the same data, Card and Krueger (1995) demonstrate that
the findings of Neumark and Wascher are sensitive to the inclusion of the pro-
portion of individuals enrolled in school. By claiming that the enrolment ratio
should be excluded from the estimation (since it depends on the minimum wage
and not the opposite), they obtain non-negative values for the elasticity. The
studies just described are the expression of the long debate about the effects of
the minimum wage, which still accompanies much of the recent literature.
2.2.2 Linking minimum wage and immigration
One of the first studies to explore the links between minimum wage and mo-
bility is the two-sector model of Harris and Todaro (1970), where the minimum
wage is used to explain the persistence of high levels of urban unemployment in
3The literature focuses on employment rather than unemployment because the second is
thought to be latent, since the minimum wage exerts, in the first instance, an effect on the
labour force participation. If individuals are discouraged to enter/stay in the labour force,
the unemployment effects would understate the true effect of the policy. On the other hand,
the analysis of the employment rate of particular groups is a plausible measure for the labour
market effects of the minimum wage, provided adequate control for macroeconomic factors is
taken. A comprehensive survey on minimum wage is Neumark and Wascher (2006).
6
2.2.2 Linking minimum wage and immigration
some developing countries. This framework assumes that agents take decisions
in terms of expected wages. Workers continue to migrate from the rural sector
until the urban expected minimum wage equals the agricultural earnings; the
excess labour remains hence unemployed.
The only theoretical work that extends the Harris-Todaro framework to the con-
text of international migration is Basu (1995); similarly, the empirical literature
that explores this particular link is rather scarce. This is somewhat surprising,
in light of the fact that welfare benefits are likely to influence the location choice
of immigrants, as discussed by Borjas (1999). Borjas shows that immigrants are
particularly responsive to welfare programs and that this can explain in part the
clustering of immigrants in few States.
To date, Castillo-Freeman and Freeman (1992) is the only relevant study that
investigates the relationship between minimum wage and immigration. The au-
thors explore the changes in the migration out of Puerto Rico as a consequence
of the extension of the U.S. minimum wage to the island. They document that
the minimum wage impact substantially increased over the years, reaching 60%
of the average wage in 1987 (this compares to less than 35% in the USA). By
analysing migration and inter-industry employment patterns, the authors con-
clude that the increase of the minimum wage induced a movement of low-skilled
workers towards the USA, preventing high levels of unemployment.
The framework presented in this Chapter is somewhat opposite to that of Castillo-
Freeman and Freeman, in that minimum wage is studied as a pulling rather than
a pushing factor. However, as effectively highlighted in their work, “Economic
analysis has no clear prediction about how the volume of migration might respond
to higher minimum wages.”4. This statement embodies the fact that the effects
of the policy are ambiguous and hence immigration could increase or decrease
as a consequence of the minimum wage. In the next Section, such ambiguous
effects are cast into a theoretical framework that links the policy with changes
in immigrants’ expected wages.
4Castillo-Freeman and Freeman (1992, p.189) use this statement in the context of emi-
gration. They discuss the fact that, since an increase of the minimum wage implies both
a reduction in employment and an increase in wages, less-skilled workers are more likely to
emigrate, while relatively more-skilled workers are less willing to move.
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The key feature of the model is that potential migrants take decisions in
terms of expected wages, as in Harris and Todaro (1970). To keep the model
as simple as possible, it is assumed that potential migrants belong to two skill
groups, high (h) and low (l) skilled. At any time, high-skilled workers earn a
wage above the minimum. The immigration flow to each State j at a given time
can be represented by the following expression:
msjt = F (ωsjt, zjt), (2.1)
where ωsjt = wsjtesjt; the term ωsjt represents the expected wage of skill group s,
and wsjt and e
s
jt are the wage and the employment population ratio of skill group
s ∈ {l, h} in the receiving country. The term zjt represents characteristics of the
State j or conditions in the sending countries. The migration function has the
feature that Fω(ω, z) > 0. At each time, and assuming that the federal minimum
wage affects only the average wages, the effect on immigration can be represented
by the following expression:
∂msj
∂w¯
= Fω dωsj
dw¯
. (2.2)
It is plausible to assume that
dωhj
dw¯ = 0, i.e., the minimum wage will not affect
the labour market of high-skilled workers5. The effect on immigration on low-
skilled workers will hence depend on the magnitude and sign of
dωlj
dw¯ , which can
be decomposed into:
dωlj
dw¯
= ∂wlj
∂w¯
elj + ∂elj∂w¯ wlj, (2.3)
The expression 2.3 is unambiguously positive only if
∂elj
∂w¯ > 0. If this term is
negative, the sign and the magnitude depend on the relative impacts of the
wage and employment effects. Notice that this condition can be rewritten as:
dωlj
dw¯ > 0 ⇐⇒ desjdwsj wsjesj < 1, i.e., the labour demand elasticity is below unity. The
economic rationale is that the incentive to migrate induced by higher wages might
be offset by potential adverse effects on employment prospects.
5For simplicity it is assumed that F lω = Fhω , i.e., low- and high-skilled workers react to
changes in expected wages with the same magnitude.
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The model presented in equation 2.1 explains the relationship between the
changes in immigration flows and the growth of expected wages. This relationship
can be cast into an econometric specification that uses variations across States:
∆msj
Pj
= α + β∆ωsj +∆Zj + εsj , (2.4)
where
∆msj
Pj
is the change in the immigration inflow rate, ∆ωsj represents the
growth in the expected wages, and Zj is a set of covariates to control for changes
in macroeconomic fundamentals of State j; εsj represents a random component.
The parameter of interest is β, which captures the sensitivity of the migration
inflows to the growth of expected wages.
Some observations about equation 2.4 are necessary. First, the specification uses
differences, which has the advantage of washing out fixed effects that characterize
each observational unit (Dustmann et al., 2003). As an example, if immigrants
move to States with persistent prosperous conditions, a regression of immigration
flows on minimum wage could hide a spurious relationship or lead to an upward
bias in the estimates. Using first differences allows to filter out such persistent
components.
Second, the term ∆ωsj is endogenous. This is because the growth of average wages
and of employment population ratio are simultaneously determined by a change
in the minimum wage (Card, 1992), hence creating measurement error in ωsj . In
addition, immigration flows will lead to a simultaneity bias because they will
affect equilibrium wage and employment in the destination country. To solve
this problem, the expected wages are instrumented by the fraction of affected
immigrants, i.e., immigrants who earn between the new and old minimum wage.
Card (1992) uses the fraction of affected teenagers because this is thought to
be correlated with the change in average wages, but exogenous to changes in
employment. He obtains two reduced-form equations for changes in wages and
changes in employment. The present work builds upon this methodology by
combining wage and employment equations into a reduced form for changes in
expected wages as a function of the fraction of affected immigrants:
∆ωsj = a + θBsj + υsj . (2.5)
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The Appendix shows that equation 2.5 is obtained by exploiting the additive
property of OLS. The term B represents the fraction of affected immigrants and
θ captures the causal effect of the minimum wage on expected wages or, more
precisely, the semi-elasticity of the expected wages with respect to the fraction of
affected workers. Equation 2.5 is the econometric equivalent of equation 2.3: it is
important to note that the parameter θ combines the effect of the minimum wage
on both changes in the average wages and in the employment probability in a
given period. This can be decomposed into the two effects. The Appendix shows
that θ corresponds to the sum of the semi-elasticity of the two reduced-form
equations used by Card (1992) and gives mathematical proof of the ambiguity
of its sign, as previously discussed.
The third observation is that the model uses inflow rates, i.e., immigration flows
divided by the working population in each State before immigration. The use of
a relative measure acknowledges the fact that immigration inflows are a function
of the size of each State. As a robustness check, results are presented also for
the differences in the level of immigration inflows.
A potential issue with the empirical analysis is the possibility that the policy
is not exogenous with respect to the macroeconomic conditions of each State.
This would be the case of a State minimum wage, where each government may
decide to increase the level of the minimum wage in response to some macroeco-
nomic events (for example, very low wages for certain groups of the population).
Such a situation could lead to a spurious (perhaps negative) correlation between
immigration and minimum wage, because immigrants will tend to move, ceteris
paribus, where wages are higher. This is the reason why the analysis is focused
on the federal minimum wage, the implementation of which can be thought to
be exogenous to single State macroeconomic conditions.
2.5 Data description
This study focuses on the minimum wage increase that took place in 1996
and in 1997. The first increase from $4.25 to $4.75 took place in October 1996,
followed by an increase to $5.15 in September 1997.
The data used in the analysis come from the monthly Current Population Survey
for the period 1994 to 1999 and from the 1990 and 2000 Censuses. Information
on wages, employment status, unemployment and the fraction of affected im-
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migrants is extracted from the CPS. This sample yields a total of more than
10,000,000 individual observations; this enormous amount is needed because
cases of immigrants are, on average, 10% of the total sample and wage and em-
ployment information is collected only for the outgoing rotation groups (one sixth
of the total). Since a limited amount of observations would create noise when
deriving observations at State level, data have been pooled over the two years
before and after the increase of the minimum wage. Each year starts in October
and ends in September6. Sample weights are applied to make the data nationally
representative.
From the CPS it is possible to derive different measures for hourly earnings. In
this Chapter, two measures of hourly wages are used, which will be henceforth
referred to as actual and constructed hourly wages. The actual hourly wages are
derived using responses of individuals who report an hourly wage and are paid by
the hour7. The constructed State hourly wages are obtained using information
on weekly wages of workers paid at a frequency different from hourly and usual
hours worked in a week. This measure is likely to be noisy, since both denomina-
tor and numerator are measured with error; however, it produces a larger amount
of information. Since the effect of minimum wage is measured with higher pre-
cision with the actual hourly wages, these will be used as a benchmark in the
estimation. Robustness tests will include the results using constructed hourly
wages too. All wages below $1 are excluded; values beyond $30 and $40 are re-
moved for the actual and constructed wages, respectively. This procedure is such
that less than 1% of observations are censored, and it helps in moderating the
measurement error. The growth of wages is defined as the difference of the log
average wages before and after the increase of the minimum wage. The fraction
of affected immigrants corresponds to the portion of immigrants (over the total
reporting wages) who earn between the old ($4.25) and the new ($5.15) federal
minimum wage in the period before the increase. The employment population
ratio is defined as the proportion of employed immigrants over the working age
immigrant population in each State. This excludes persons aged over 64 and
under 16, but includes individuals that are enrolled in schools. The growth of
employment is defined as the difference in the log of employment population ra-
6This particular timing allows the capturing of the exact period before the increase of the
minimum wage (October 1996). The period after the increase is here computed from October
1997, although the second part of the increase in the minimum wage took place in September;
this is done to allow comparability with the period before the increase and to rule out potential
seasonal effects.
7In unreported results, the analysis has been carried out also including respondents who
report an hourly rate but who are paid at a different frequency. Inferences are substantially
identical.
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tio. The growth of expected wages is then defined as the product of the growth of
wages and the growth of employment. CPS data are also used to compute wage
and unemployment changes for the group of prime-age natives in each State,
which are used as control variables in some of the specifications.
Data from the 2000 Census are drawn from the 5% Public Use Microdata Sam-
ples. These are used to compute immigration flows before and after the increase
of the minimum wage. Flows before the increase include individuals who im-
migrated into the USA between January 1995 and December 1996, while flows
after the increase contain immigrants who entered the USA between January
1998 and December 19998. Flows include only persons who report earnings and
are classified depending on their hourly wage, which is obtained by dividing the
reported earnings by the hours worked in a year9.
Since flows are likely to be measured with some error, three different “treatment”
groups are defined: I) with earnings between $4.25 and $6.50; II) with earnings
between $4.25 and $7.15; III) with earnings between $3.75 and $5.65. Group
I is considered the benchmark for the analysis since it includes all individuals
that earn between the old minimum wage and the highest State minimum wage.
The lower bound of $4.25 is justified to account for the presence of sub-minimum
wages or imperfect compliance. The upper bound of $6.50 is set to include in-
dividuals who migrated because of the federal minimum wage but who, after
immigration, earn a State minimum wage which is higher than the federal rate
and thus binding at the moment of the Census10. Group II consists of all indi-
viduals of group I and of immigrants who might be affected by spillover effects.
The upper bound of the group is set at $2 above the federal minimum wage and
hence captures potential “ripple” effects for individuals who earn a wage that
is already 40% higher than the minimum. Group III includes a wage “window”
that is $0.50 below the old minimum floor and $0.50 above the new one11.
Three more groups are created, which include individuals who earn between:
8Census data can only be categorized by calendar year. This creates a small mismatch
between CPS and Census data. However, three months is a plausible gap if immigrants tend to
respond to minimum wage changes with a lag because of, for example, delay in the circulation
of information.
9The hours worked in a year are calculated using average hours worked in a week and the
weeks worked in a year.
10At the end of 1999, the State minimum wage in Massachusetts was $5.25; in Alaska,
Connecticut, Delaware and Rhode Island $5.65; in California and Vermont $5.75 and in Oregon
$6.50. The Appendix reports the value of the State minimum wage and the dates of the
introduction of the law.
11Robustness checks have also been conducted on the group with earnings between $4.65
and $5.65 (i.e., $0.50 above and below the new threshold). Results are very similar to those
for Group III.
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IV) $6.51 and $9.00; V) $9.01 and $14.00; VI) $14.01 and $30.00. Each of these
groups corresponds to roughly one third of the total flows of immigrants who
earn wages higher than individuals above group I and will be used to implement
placebo tests.
Finally, data from Census 1990 come from the Tables computed by the USA
Census Office and are used to construct variables for the historical settlement of
immigrants, used in some specifications.
2.5.1 Facts about minimum wage and immigration
Table 2.1 presents the characteristics of different population groups in the
period before the federal minimum wage increase. The first row reports the frac-
tion of affected workers, defined as the proportion of individuals earning between
the old and the new minimum wage. About 15% of the total population earns
wages between $4.25 and $5.14. It must be noted that this share is relatively high
if compared to other studies (e.g., Cortes, 2004); the reason is that the hourly
wages used here are those reported from hourly workers, as this is thought to
better capture the impact of the policy.
Table 2.1: Characteristics of minimum wage earners before the 1996/7 increase
Immigrants Total Women Blacks Hispanics Teenagers
population
Fraction of affected workers 19.24 15.40 17.99 18.41 22.48 51.68
Hourly wages 8.41 9.25 8.44 8.61 7.95 5.35
Percentage less than high school 41.16 19.02 15.79 18.53 45.06 58.75
Working experience 17.62 16.04 16.57 16.48 15.20 0.22
Weekly hours worked 35.03 33.28 31.07 34.03 34.93 21.53
N 14,914 141,715 74,215 17,786 12,896 14,675
Source: monthly CPS October 1994 to September 1996. Sample weights are applied. Data refer to individuals
aged 16 to 64 who report wages. The group of Blacks also includes mixed groups; Hispanic population
corresponds to respondents indicating Hispanic origin, and may be of any race. Potential working experience
is calculated according to educational attainment as follows: age minus 17 if less than 10th grade; age minus
18 if between 11th grade and High School Diploma; age minus 19 if some college; age minus 20 if Associate
Degree; age minus 22 if Bachelor’s Degree; age minus 24 if above Bachelor’s degree.
Immigrants have a relatively high share of affected individuals (above 19%),
which is slightly larger than that of the groups of women and Blacks, but slightly
smaller than that of Hispanics (above 22%). Teenagers have the largest share
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of affected workers (above 50%); this is not surprising, given the fact that most
young workers under 19 years are employed in industries where the minimum
wage bites. Differences in the fraction of affected workers are reflected in the
hourly wages of these groups. On average, immigrants earn slightly less than
women and Blacks, but roughly $0.50 more than Hispanics. The hourly rate
for teenagers is the lowest, and corresponds to roughly 60% of the population
average.
Part of the gaps in the fraction of affected workers and in the hourly wages is at-
tributed to different levels of education of the groups. If one excludes teenagers -
since only a small part of them have completed secondary education - the groups
of immigrants and Hispanics have the largest share of individuals with attain-
ments lower than high school level. This proportion is much larger than those
of other groups, such as women and Blacks. In terms of working experience
and hours worked, however, immigrants report a value slightly larger than other
groups (except teenagers, who have basically zero working experience).
In the period under consideration, the share of affected workers differed sub-
stantially across the 51 States. This can be effectively seen from the inspection
of Figure 2.1, which represents the proportion of immigrants who earn between
$4.25 and $5.15 in each State.
Figure 2.1: Fraction of affected immigrants in the 51 States
Source: CPS. Digital boundaries from http://www.Census.gov/geo/www/tiger/index.html
In all States of the Northeast region and in the Pacific (Alaska and Hawaii), the
fraction of affected workers is under 10%. The Midwest region is quite hetero-
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geneous, but shares do not exceed 20% except in two states (North Dakota and
Kansas). Likewise, there are differences in the West region, with values that
are, in general, higher than in the Northeast and Midwest. The region with the
highest percentage is the South, where the majority of States have a fraction of
affected immigrants above 20%. There are several elements that determine these
differences. For example, States in the South have, in general, lower wages than
the remaining areas in the USA; States in the West have higher immigration of
low-wage workers than in the Northeast and the Midwest.
The fraction of affected immigrants represents a functional predictor for the im-
pact of the change in the minimum wage. To have a preliminary understanding
of the magnitude of the policy, it is useful to compare wages of immigrants before
and after the increase. This is done in Figure 2.2, which represents the kernel
wage densities for immigrants in the two periods; the vertical lines indicate the
minimum wage before October 1996 and after September 1997. The portion of
the density in blue colour that is contained between the vertical lines represents
the nationwide proportion of affected immigrants.
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Figure 2.2: Kernel density of wages before and after the minimum wage increase
Source: CPS October 1994-September 1996 (before) and CPS October 1997-September 1999 (after)
Although the wage distribution does not exhibit the classic “spike” at the min-
imum wage level, the effect of the policy is quite substantial. This is evident
from the erosion of the lower part of the wage distribution and the consequent
ripple effect that shifts the density to the right. The average wage of immigrants
increased from $8.41 before the change to $9.42 after the new minimum wage
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was set. Assuming that, in the period under scrutiny, the minimum wage was
the only determinant of wage growth, the policy determined an increase of about
12%. For comparison, wages of teenagers grew by about 16% in the same period.
This is due to the fact that a wider fraction of teenagers gain from the minimum
wage increase and this leads to a larger increase in the average hourly wage.
It is insightful to describe what has happened to immigration patterns before
and after the change of the minimum wage. In the 1990s, as in the previous two
decades, immigration to the USA increased substantially (Clark et al., 2002).
The fact that recent immigrants have tended to concentrate in a few locations,
where previous immigrants settled, is well documented (Bartel, 1989). However,
in the 1990s, immigration became less focused and immigrants began to diffuse
in a wider range of locations, as is shown in the case of Mexican immigration
studied by Card and Lewis (2005). This process of diffusion can be observed
through the dynamics of the flows across States.
Table 2.2 reports the immigration flows before and after the change of the mini-
mum wage both nationwide and for the top twelve destinations12. Entries in the
left-hand panel refer to immigrants of group I (i.e., low-wage workers), while the
right-hand panel reports figures for the total of groups IV, V and VI (i.e., higher
wage workers). For each skill group, the change in the inflow rate (i.e.,
∆msj
Pj
) is re-
ported. Although the inflows of both groups increased by about the same amount
(90,000 individuals), the dynamics were substantially different. The inflow rate
of low-wage workers in the top five States (which are also the major immigration
ports of entry) increased at a rate similar to the national average, except for New
York, where there was a decline of 0.01%. Flows of higher-wage individuals in the
top five States, on the other hand, increased by less than the national rate, with
the exception of Illinois. In particular, there was a substantial decrease in the
flows to New York. The small increase of the inflow rate in the top destinations
was balanced by the relatively large growth in other destinations. The growth of
the inflows in four States (Georgia, Massachusetts, North Carolina and Virginia)
accounted for roughly one third of the nationwide increase.
12These States represent more than 70% of total flows in both periods and roughly 53% of
the total working-age population before the minimum wage increased.
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Table 2.2: Immigration in the twelve top destination States, by selected groups
Group I Group IV, V and VI
State Working age Flows in Flows in ∆ inflow Flows in Flows in ∆ inflow
pop in 1995 1995/96 1998/99 rate (%) 1995/96 1998/99 rate (%)
USA 166,126,915 273,055 360,879 0.053 905,724 996,417 0.055
California 19,966,667 63,895 75,999 0.061 169,467 173,519 0.020
Texas 11,940,420 35,373 41,814 0.054 84,650 88,466 0.032
New York 11,569,819 28,915 27,730 -0.010 101,368 87,926 -0.116
Florida 8,631,746 28,118 33,227 0.059 84,895 83,187 -0.020
Illinois 7,477,960 14,599 18,308 0.050 50,528 55,811 0.071
New Jersey 5,070,594 11,800 14,575 0.055 45,696 47,163 0.029
Georgia 4,667,591 8,050 14,142 0.131 30,356 41,184 0.232
North Carolina 4,567,214 6,797 13,971 0.157 23,401 31,786 0.184
Virginia 4,243,680 4,505 6,831 0.055 21,637 27,675 0.142
Massachusetts 3,887,229 4,470 6,590 0.055 27,080 34,080 0.180
Washington 3,462,704 4,794 7,474 0.077 20,886 22,912 0.059
Arizona 2,587,427 8,252 11,585 0.129 20,349 21,793 0.056
Source: flows from Census 2000; population derived from CPS October 1994 to September 1996.
Sample weights are applied. Flows before the minimum wage change refer to years 1995 and 1996; flows
after the change refer to years 1998 and 1999. All flows consist of immigrants aged 16 to 64 who report
earnings in the Census.
2.6 Analysis
This Section presents the results of the estimation; the Subsections report the
estimates for the first stage regression (Subsection 2.6.1), for the second stage
(Subsection 2.6.2) and for the robustness checks (Subsection 2.6.3).
2.6.1 Estimation of the growth of expected wages
The results from the first stage regression are represented in Figure 2.3, which
plots the growth of expected wages against the fraction of affected workers, along
with the regression line and its 95% confidence interval. The graph also reports
the labels of largest immigration States and potential outliers.
The slope of the line - which represents the estimate for θ - is 0.445 (s.e. 0.110).
The explanatory power of the fraction of affected is substantial, given the fact
that the R2 is about 0.25. The graph effectively represents the fact that the larger
the fraction of affected immigrants, the larger, ceteris paribus, the growth of the
expected wages. Using the additive property of OLS, it is possible to isolate the
contributions of the fraction of affected on the wage and employment growth.
These are represented in Figure 2.4. The results of the estimation of equation
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2.5 are presented in this Subsection. This corresponds to a first stage where the
growth of expected wages is regressed on the fraction of affected immigrants.
Throughout the analysis, regressions will be weighted by the stock of immigrants
in each State; this is done with the aim of controlling for the precision with which
observations are measured. Un-weighted results will also be presented.
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Figure 2.3: Weighted regression plot of equation 2.5
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Figure 2.4: Wage and employment growth and fraction of affected immigrants
The slopes for wage and employment growth are 0.309 (s.e. 0.087) and 0.140
(s.e. 0.076) respectively, which means that an increase in the fraction of affected
immigrants of 0.1 implies a growth of 0.031 for wages and of 0.014 for employ-
ment. The wage growth overstates the growth of wages in the economy (16.3%)
and this can be attributed to spillover effects. The result for employment growth
indicates that, in the period under consideration, the minimum wage had pos-
itive effects on the employment of immigrants. This result is comparable with
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the study for consequences on teenage employment by Card and Krueger (1995),
although their estimates are somewhat smaller. One explanation is that wages
of immigrants are affected by factors omitted in the simple regression. Hence, in
Table 2.3, a series of alternative specifications is presented.
Column (a) reports the estimates of the parameter θ for the benchmark case
just outlined. Specification (b) is the un-weighted regression of model (a); the
estimates are 12 percentage points larger than the benchmark. From Figure 2.4
it can be seen that, by ignoring weights, the wage contribution would be much
larger, yielding a higher slope. A comparison of the measures of fit suggests
that the benchmark model is preferred, as it attributes less weight to outlying
observations.
Table 2.3: OLS regression of expected wage growth
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)
Fraction aff. 0.449*** 0.578*** 0.488*** 0.444*** 0.434*** 0.415*** 0.413***
(0.110) (0.206) (0.127) (0.111) (0.110) (0.104) (0.106)
Unempl. –0.032 –0.004
(0.050) (0.049)
Wages –0.292 –0.041
(0.232) (0.247)
CPI 0.046*** 0.044**
(0.016) (0.019)
Constant 0.082*** 0.058 0.082*** 0.075*** 0.105*** –0.206* –0.194
(0.022) (0.037) (0.019) (0.025) (0.029) (0.103) (0.126)
R2 0.25 0.14 0.23 0.26 0.28 0.36 0.36
N 51 51 51 51 51 51 51
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ significant at 1%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗ significant at 10%. The
reported coefficient refers to the fraction of affected immigrants. All models except (b) are weighted by the
stock of foreign-born population in each State. The macroeconomic controls are all measured in terms of their
growth.
Model (c) uses constructed hourly wages; the coefficient is four points larger than
in (a). This is explained by the fact that, although the average growth of con-
structed wages is slightly smaller than that of actual wages (10% vs 12%), the
average fraction of affected immigrants is substantially smaller (14% vs 19%);
hence the coefficient needs to be larger to explain the wage growth.
Models from (d) introduce macroeconomic variables to control for unobserved
changes in the economy that could be omitted by the benchmark case. These
are the growth of unemployment rate and of native wages in each State and the
growth of the regional Consumer Price Index (CPI)13. Only the CPI is statis-
tically significant for explaining the wage growth of immigrants, but this does
13Historical CPI data are downloaded from the website http://www.bls.gov/cpi/. The values
of this index are only available for the four macro regions: West, Midwest, Northeast and South.
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not affect substantially the estimate of θ, even when the control variables are
estimated jointly. Interestingly, while the growth of unemployment rate has the
expected sign, the wage growth of natives is negative, although it becomes es-
sentially zero when all control variables are included.
The results presented above robustly support the fact that the increase in the
minimum wage, as measured by the fraction of affected immigrants, leads to a
substantial growth of expected wages. This large increase is attributable to the
fact that, in the period under analysis, the minimum wage did not have negative
effects on employment. The estimates imply a labour demand elasticity of 0.30,
which is directly comparable with the value of 0.45 derived from the specification
in the study by Card and Krueger (1995) that is mostly similar to the one in
Table 2.3. The Appendix reports the derivation of this elasticity14.
2.6.2 Estimation of the change in immigration flows
In this Section, the second stage of the model is estimated. This corresponds
to estimating the regression equation 2.4, with the growth of expected wages in-
strumented by the fraction of affected workers. The aim is to obtain an estimate
of the coefficient β, which measures the sensitivity of the change of the migration
inflow rate with respect to the growth of expected wages.
Before presenting the results of the regression, it is useful to illustrate the prob-
lem of endogeneity and the need for using the instrumental variable approach.
In Figure 2.5, the relationship between the growth of immigration inflow rate
and the expected wages is represented. The left-hand panel contains the ex-
pected wage growth as calculated from the data (and hence endogenous); the
right-hand panel represents the predicted values from the first stage. In both
graphs the regression line and its 95% confidence interval along with the 95%
prediction bands are represented. The graphs reveal that if the endogenous vari-
able were used, the relationship would be basically non-existent. On the other
hand, the relationship becomes positive when the predicted values of the growth
of expected wages are used, with an estimate of β of about 0.005 (s.e. 0.002).
These estimates are insensitive to the exclusion of the outliers represented by the
observations outside the 95% prediction interval. To better understand the eco-
nomic impact of the estimates, some examples are useful. The average increase
14The value of 0.46 can be derived from the estimates contained in columns (1) and (3) of
Table 4.4 panel B, page 128 of Card and Krueger (1995).
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in the inflow rate for the wage group I is 0.052%. In States such as Maine, where
the predicted growth of expected wages is 10%, the immigration inflow as fitted
by the regression line is relatively low (the change was 0.017%). In States such
as California, where wages grew by about 19%, the regression line predicts an
inflow rate change of 0.062%. This means that 9 percentage points growth of
expected wages contributed to an inflow rate change that is 0.045% larger. In
other words, if the expected wages in California grew by 10% only, there would
have been, ceteris paribus, an inflow of about 3,000 low-wage immigrants against
the actual 12,000.
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Figure 2.5: Change in the immigration inflow rate and growth of expected wages
The results of the second stage regression are reported in Table 2.4 for all models
presented in Table 2.3 and for additional specifications. For illustration purposes,
all estimates and standard errors, except those in column (h), are multiplied by
a factor of 100. The comparison of columns (a), (b) and (c) reveals that the
un-weighted estimates yield a smaller coefficient than the benchmark case while
using the measure for constructed wages produces a larger value. On the other
hand, the introduction of macroeconomic controls does not change substantially
the value of the estimates, as can be seen from the models (d) to (g). It is inter-
esting to note that, while the wage growth of natives is an important factor in
explaining cross-states differences in the change of the inflow rate, the growth of
unemployment rate and the CPI are not, although they both have the expected
sign. In columns (h) and (i) the specifications for the immigrants in the wage
groups II and III are presented. The reported value of β for group II is larger
than the benchmark case. Since the upper limit of this group is $2 larger than
the federal minimum wage, it is possible that the presence of spillover effects
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also attracts immigrants who earn above the minimum wage. Consistently, the
coefficient for group III is smaller than that for group I. This can be explained by
the fact that the minimum wage window is narrower (the upper limit is $5.65)
and this would exclude all immigrants who were earning the State minimum
wage at the moment of the Census15. Column (j) includes the concentration of
immigrants in 1990, defined as the stock of foreign-born divided by the popula-
tion in each State at the time of the 1990 Census. The rationale of adding this
variable is to control for the presence of fixed effects that are not captured by
using first differences. The estimate of β is actually larger than the benchmark
case. The coefficient for the historical immigration concentration is negative al-
though not significant. At first sight, the negative sign might appear a strange
result, considering the tendency of new immigrants to move to where previous
foreign-born populations had settled. However, it is important to recall the fact
that the dependent variable in question is the change in the inflow rates. Hence,
this means that flows grow relatively more in locations where immigration was
historically lower16. This fact is also documented by Card and Lewis (2005) who
found that Mexican immigrants (who represent the largest share of low-wage
immigrants) progressively settle away from traditional immigration gateways.
Finally, in column (k) inflows rather than inflow rates are used in a regression
without weights17. Obviously the estimates are not comparable with those of
the previous models, but they constitute a robustness test which demonstrates
that, even without controlling for population size, the results are similar. The
table also reports the values of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test for endo-
geneity. The null hypothesis is that the OLS estimator is consistent (under the
assumption that the instrument is valid). The test is carried out by augmenting
the second stage regression with the residuals of an ancillary regression in which
the endogenous variable is regressed on all exogenous covariates (including the
instrument). If the parameter accruing to the residuals is significantly different
from zero, then the null is rejected. As can be seen, the hypothesis that OLS is
consistent is strongly rejected in all specifications.
15For example, California has had a minimum wage of $5.75 since March 1998.
16On the other hand, flows are highly correlated with historical stocks. As an example, a
regression of the inflow rate after the minimum wage change (i.e.,
msj1
Pj1
) on the 1990 immigration
concentration would yield an R2 over 0.40.
17When the dependent variable is in level, weights would tend to overestimate the value of
the parameter.
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2.6.3 Placebo tests
A counterfactual analysis of the previous results can be obtained by test-
ing the effect of the policy on groups that are thought to be excluded by the
treatment. This Section presents placebo tests using the wage groups IV, V and
VI. These are groups formed by immigrants who earn a wage higher than the
minimum and hence other factors, such as the change in macroeconomic char-
acteristics, are expected to explain cross-state differences in their inflow rates.
The regressions below present the results for models with and without control
variables.
Table 2.5: Placebo tests (coefficients × 100)
Group III) Group IV) Group V)
Expected wages growth –0.058 0.011 0.073 0.106 0.092 0.064
(0.156) (0.141) (0.160) (0.169) (0.146) (0.145)
Unempl. –0.013 –0.025 –0.087***
(0.027) (0.032) (0.028)
Wages 0.620*** 0.379** 0.128
(0.135) (0.163) (0.140)
CPI –0.001 0.002 0.010
(0.012) (0.015) (0.013)
Constant 0.000 –0.000 –0.000 –0.001 0.000 –0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
N 51 51 51 51 51 51
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ significant at 1%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗ significant at
10%. The reported coefficient refers to the growth of expected wages. All models are weighted by
the stock of foreign-born population in each State. The macroeconomic controls are all measured
in terms of their growth. See text for a definition of the wage groups.
The results consistently demonstrate that the growth of expected wages - as
instrumented by the fraction of affected immigrants - is not significant in ex-
plaining the change in the inflow rate of immigrants with earnings higher than
the minimum wage. On the other side, the growth of prime-age native wages
is very important in explaining the change in the inflow rate for group IV and
V, while unemployment is very important for VI; the CPI has the expected sign
only for group IV, but none of the estimates is significant.
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2.7 Discussion and final remarks
The present Chapter studies an unexplored aspect of the minimum wage: its
pulling effect for immigrants. The investigation of the linkages between migra-
tion and the minimum wage is of particular relevance in the context of recent
socio/economic events that occurred in the US. The immigrant population rose
systematically during the 1990s and as of 2000 the share of immigrants exceeded
11% of the total population18. In parallel to these events, the history of minimum
wage legislations also experienced remarkable changes: after a steady decline in
the 1980s, the two increases in 1991/1992 and 1996/1997 contributed to bring
back the real value of the minimum wage to the level of 1980.
There are two main findings in this study: first, in the period under considera-
tion, the minimum wage contributed significantly to the increase of the average
wages of immigrants. In addition, there seems to be a positive effect on em-
ployment, and this result supports the hypothesis that there are frictions in the
labour market which can be alleviated through the policy. These positive effects
on the labour market outcomes have increased the gains that potential immi-
grants could attain by an average of 15% (as measured by the increase in the
expected wages). The second result is that low-wage immigrants are responsive
to the growth of expected wages. This quantity, as instrumented by the fraction
of affected workers, robustly predicts cross-section differences in the change of
inflow rates. Groups of immigrants who earn more than the minimum wage are
instead insensitive to the expected gains produced by the policy.
There is much more to learn about immigration and minimum wages. The em-
pirical analysis in this Chapter exploits a quasi-natural experiment consisting of
an exogenous change in the policy, and hence is focused on the federal minimum
wage. However, changes in the federal law are quite rare and hence future studies
that want to look at this relationship should concentrate in a panel data design
which contains both data across States and over time, as done in previous stud-
ies that investigate unemployment effects on teenagers (Burkhauser et al. 2000;
Neumark and Wascher 1992). This approach would have two advantages: first,
the cross-State data in the recent decades have been enriched by the presence of
many States which set their own minimum wage and which have different immi-
gration dynamics. The panel data design will be useful to accurately control for
State fixed effects. Second, minimum wages effects are interesting also when the
18Data from Census 2000. In terms of civilian population, the CPS reveals that this figure
is just above 10%, due to their different definitions.
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nominal wage does not change; the model in the present Chapter predicts that
the erosion of the nominal value will lead to a decrease in the expected wages of
immigrants. Analysing the consequences on immigration of a decline in the real
minimum wage is an interesting question to be explored in light of the fact that
the federal minimum stood at the same level for nearly 10 years19. Hopefully this
study will provide useful prescriptions for a better planning of policies related
with immigration and with the minimum wage. The present Chapter demon-
strates the existence of an important relationship, and policies intended to cope
with the growing concentration of foreign-born, such as the monitoring of migra-
tion levels and the provision of social services, should take into consideration the
fact that the minimum wage is an important asset for low-wage earners, capable
of inducing them to move to another country.
19The federal rate was recently increased by a new minimum wage bill which established a
three-stage increase: $5.85 after July 2007; $6.55 after July 2008; $7.25 by August 2009. This
corresponds to an increase in the nominal wage of more than 40%. On the other hand, during
the past decade, several States passed laws that introduced a rate higher than the federal: in
1997 only 7 States adopted their own minimum wage; by 2006 this number was 18.
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Appendix
a) Derivation of equation 2.5
The growth of expected wages can be decomposed into wage and employment
growth as follows:
∆ωsj = ∆wsj +∆esj , (A1)
where ∆wsj and ∆e
s
j are the log difference of average wages and employment
population ratio, respectively. Following Card (1992), the equations for labour
demand and the reduced form for wage growth can be defined as:
∆esj = a + η∆wsj + νsj , (A2)
∆wsj = α + λBsj + ζsj . (A3)
The term Bsj is exogenous and hence can be used to estimate ∆w
s
j ; the predicted
value is then inserted in the equation for the change in employment to obtain:
∆esj = a + ηα + ηλBsj + ηζsj + νsj . (A4)
To obtain equation 2.5, substitute A3 and A4 into A1 and use the OLS additive
property to obtain:
∆ωsj = c + θBsj + υsj , (A5)
where c = a + (1 + η)α, θ = (1 + η)λ and υsj = (1 + η)ζsj + νsj .
b) Derivation of elasticity
The parameter η corresponds to the elasticity of the labour demand, η ≈ d(∆esj)d(∆wsj ) .
This is because:
∆ws = log (ws1
ws0
) ≈ ws1 −ws0
ws0
= ∆w
ws0
∆es = log (es1
es0
) ≈ es1 − es0
es0
= ∆e
es0
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c) Sign of θ
Appendix a) has shown that θ depends on λ and η; the sign is however ambigu-
ous. This is because, although the minimum wage has unambiguous positive
effect on the average wages (i.e., λ > 0), its sign depends on η.
If η < −1, i.e., in the elastic part of the demand curve, expected wages decrease
because the negative effect on employment more than compensate the positive
benefits in terms of wage differentials.
If −1 < η < 0, the expected wages react positively to an increase in the minimum
wages, but the increase of λ will be slowed down, i.e., θ < λ.
If η ≥ 0, the positive effect of employment adds up to that of wages. This only
happens if employment changes are not demand-constrained, i.e., are measured
along the supply curve, as in the case of monopsonistic labour markets.
d) Mechanism of the fraction of affected immigrants
For illustration, and following what Card (1992) did for the teenagers, consider
how much of the wage increase to comply with the new minimum wage is pre-
dicted by the fraction of affected immigrants. The average wage in the economy
after the minimum wage change is $5.23. This value is larger than the fed-
eral minimum wage because during the period under consideration some States
passed a law that increased the minimum wage to a value higher than $5.15 and
thus this weighted average takes into account the different times of the introduc-
tion of state and federal laws. The average wage of minimum wage immigrant
workers in the period 1994/1996 was $4.71; in order to comply with the new av-
erage minimum wage, average wages have to increase by 11%. Since the average
fraction of affected immigrants was about 19%, one would expect wages to grow
by 0.11 × 0.19 = 2.09%. Instead, the growth of average wages was 11.75% (from
$8.41 to $9.42); average wages grew for other reasons, but at least in the short
run, one can assume that these causes are not State-specific. If so, they will be
absorbed by the constant of the reduced form regression of wage growth on the
fraction of affected workers. As shown in the text, the regression of equation
A3 for wage growth yields a coefficient of the fraction of affected of about 0.31;
by multiplying this result by the fraction of affected immigrants, one obtains a
prediction of wage growth equal to 5.89%. This overestimates the “expected” in-
crease by a factor of 5.89/2.09 = 0.31/0.11. = 2.82. This is somewhat higher than
the value found by Card (1992), i.e., 0.15/0.088 = 1.70. This over-prediction can
be ascribed to several factors: inspection of the data reveals that this overesti-
mate is partially attributable to spillover effects.
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e) States with different levels of the minimum wage
State Minimum wage Date of introduction
Alaska 5.65 Sep 1997
California 5.75 Mar 1998
Connecticut 5.65 Jan 1999
Delaware 5.65 May 1999
Hawaii 5.25 Jan 1994
Maine 5.25 Jan 1997
Oregon 5.50 Jan 1997
6.00 Jan 1998
6.50 Jan 1999
Rhode Island 5.65 Jul 1999
Vermont 5.25 Jan 1998
Washington DC 6.15 Jan 1998
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Chapter 3
Immigration and Displacement
across Local Labour Markets
3.1 Introduction
The impact of immigration is at the centre of public debate in all developed
and developing countries. Mainstream studies about the consequences of immi-
gration focus on the impacts on labour market outcomes of the host country
such as wages, employment and participation. However, as observed by several
authors (e.g., Filer, 1992; Borjas, 2003), even if immigration flows do not have
adverse effects on wages or employment, they could exert pressures on the labour
market that induce out-migration of previous residents towards areas with lower
immigrant concentrations. The question of immigration to the UK induces dis-
placement in local labour markets has received the attention of scholars only
recently (e.g., Hatton and Tani, 2005; Lemos and Portes, 2008). The aim of this
Chapter is to contribute to this literature by exploring some methodological and
empirical issues that have not been addressed before. This is done by proposing
a framework with the following features: 1) labour markets are identified by lo-
cal authority districts (LAD)20; 2) each LAD is segmented into qualification/age
groups; 3) the impact of immigration is studied separately for natives and earlier
immigrants.
Most UK studies are based on regional data, since widely used sources of mi-
gration data such as the Labour Force Survey (LFS) and the General Household
Survey (GHS) are published on this geographical scale. However, a great deal of
labour-based migration occurs between more finely delineated areas than regions:
data from the 2001 Census of England and Wales show that among the fraction
20A map of the LAD of England and Wales is reported in the Appendix.
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of migrants who changed LAD between 2000 and 2001, only 45% moved across
Governmental Office Regions (GOR). One of the advantages of using LADs is
that they can better identify differences across local economies (such as pushing
and pulling determinants for migration) that are usually ignored on a regional
scale. A region such as the North West, for example, includes thriving LADs
with favourable employment prospects, along with more depressed areas charac-
terised by high unemployment rates. A finer definition of local labour market is
also important for measuring immigrants’ concentration: as an example, Greater
London - which is the main region of destination for international migrants -
includes LADs with high immigration rates such as Kensington & Chelsea and
peripheral LADs with relatively low concentrations, such as Bexley. A potential
drawback is that movements between neighbouring LADs could mask changes
of residence rather than migrations to different labour markets. This problem is
addressed by testing the sensitivity of the results with a geography formed by
travel to work areas (TTWA).
A key issue about the study of the displacement effect is the analysis of different
types of labour. In order to acknowledge the fact that workers are heterogeneous
in their skill levels, LADs are segmented into qualification and age cells. Work-
ers with different skill levels face different competition pressures on their labour
market outcomes: other things being equal, young and poorly educated workers
are more exposed to the risk of wage and employment declines than a skilled
labour force. As a consequence, the potential reaction triggered by immigration
is likely to be dissimilar for these two groups. An advantage of analysing different
skill groups is to better account for the particular composition of international
migration. Similarly to the case of other countries, new immigrants to the UK
are relatively young: the Census table commissioned for the analysis shows that
nearly 93% of the flows of foreign-born immigrants who arrived in England and
Wales between 2000 and 2001 are younger than 45 years. Perhaps differently
from many other countries, however, the large majority of these new immigrants
are relatively highly educated: more than 70% of the new foreign-born immi-
grants hold at least an A-level (or its UK equivalent). This contrasts with less
than 30% of the total resident population in 2000 holding such qualifications.
An important feature of this work is the distinction between the impact of immi-
gration on natives and on earlier immigrants (defined as those immigrants who
arrived before the year 2000). Newly arrived immigrants are more likely to have
characteristics that are similar to earlier immigrants than to natives. In particu-
lar, they are likely to have analogous skill profiles and choose similar occupations.
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This fact is embodied in the analysis by allowing for imperfect substitutability
between immigrants and natives. Immigrants are also likely to choose similar
destinations due to the existence of social networks shared by new and previous
immigrants. As an example, Census data show that eight out of the ten top des-
tinations are the same for new and earlier immigrants, as well as six out of the
bottom ten. Hence, the analysis of substitution effects between new immigrants
and resident population requires us to account for the different effect on natives
and earlier cohorts of foreign-born persons. To date, no study has addressed in
such detail the displacement effect question for the case of England and Wales.
Works such as Hatton and Tani (2005) exploit time series variation of migration
data, but only consider regionally based flows; on the other hand, Lemos and
Portes (2008) use data at LAD level, but only for aggregated flows, without dis-
tinguishing between skill level or country of birth.
The analysis of displacement is carried out by firstly proposing a theoretical
framework that models the mechanism through which wages and employment of
previous residents adjust in response to immigrant inflows. The empirical analy-
sis is implemented by the aid of an econometric model where internal movements
are related with immigration flows, which measure the penetration of recently
arrived foreign-born persons into the local labour market.
The issue of potential endogeneity arising from the correlation between unob-
served LAD/skill-specific factors and migration flows is addressed by introducing
fixed effects and by instrumenting the current immigration flows with historical
settlements of foreign-born persons. To this aim, a dataset that combines in-
formation from Census migration tables and Census microdata are used. Two
features render this dataset unique: first, migration rates are derived using 100%
of the observed working-age population flows instead of using small samples such
as those from the LFS or the International Passenger Survey (IPS). Second, data
have been obtained from the Office for National Statistics (ONS), under special
conditions, without the application of the small cell counts confidentiality rou-
tine, which could otherwise affect estimations that involve small areas21.
The results of the analysis show that international migration does not displace
native working-age population; instead, both natives and new immigrants move
to the same local labour markets. However, there is evidence of displacement for
21ONS applies a confidentiality routine to all tables from 2001 Census, consisting of an
adjustment to small cell counts. Details on disclosure protection measures can be found
athttp://www.statistics.gov.uk/Census2001/discloseprotect.asp. At Local Authority District
Level, this procedure is likely to affect most of the migration indices, such as the net migration
rates considered in this Chapter. A thorough discussion of the effects of small cell adjustment
on migration interaction data is in Duke-Williams and Stillwell (2007).
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earlier immigrants, particularly for workers with no or low qualifications. These
findings corroborate the conjecture that immigrants and natives are imperfect
substitutes in production.
The next Section contains a brief review of the literature on displacement. A
theoretical model which explains the mechanism through which an increase of
immigration affects wages and employment rates in the local labour market is
outlined in Section 3. This is used in Section 4 to derive the econometric specifi-
cation which is the base for the estimation. Section 5 contains a description of the
data, along with summary statistics. Analysis is carried out in Section 6, where
different OLS and IV specifications are estimated and results are contrasted.
The subsequent Section contains the sensitivity analysis, which is performed by
removing the student population, using TTWA as definition for local labour
markets, analysing origin-destination specific flows, and implementing predicted
occupation groups. Section 8 summarises the results and proposes potential av-
enues for future research.
3.2 Reviewing the literature on displacement
The literature on the consequences of immigration in the labour market is
well established, especially for the case of the USA. A seminal approach has in-
volved the use of the spatial correlation method, which consists of studying the
correlations between wages and employment and some measure of immigration
in the local labour market. On the basis of this methodology, the majority of
studies have concluded that immigration has no or negligible adverse effects on
wages or employment of natives.
Filer (1992) criticises the spatial correlation approach claiming that it ignores the
fact that, by exerting downward pressure on wages and reducing employment op-
portunities in the local labour market, immigration induces previous residents
to move towards areas with lower immigration concentration. The study of the
spatial correlations will then fail to capture the true impact of migration sim-
ply because its effects are diluted countrywide. Using data from the 1980 USA
Census for the standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSA), Filer analyses
the correlations between immigration and net migration by ethnic group, quali-
fication attainment and occupation, and estimates models which include several
control variables. His regression results suggest that a 10% increase in the SMSA
labour supply induced by immigration leads to a net out-migration of natives of
about 12%, with effects that are larger among poorly-educated workers.
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A series of studies have followed since Filer’s pioneering work, with mixed find-
ings. Card (2001) proposes a theoretical model where each SMSA is a single
output producer with labour inputs consisting of CES-type aggregated occupa-
tions. He derives a reduced form that correlates the effect of immigration on
internal migration, wages and employment rates of natives and earlier cohorts of
immigrants. Using data from the 1991 USA Census, Card estimates several mod-
els where total population growth and migration measures (i.e., net migration,
out-migration and in-migration) are expressed as a function of the immigration
rate in each SMSA/occupation cell. To control for potential unobserved demand
factors that might be correlated with both internal and international movements,
he uses an instrumental variable approach where historical settlements of immi-
grants - arguably exogenous with respect to present demand shocks - are a predic-
tor for current immigration flows. The results show no evidence of displacement
effects, with internal movements of natives and earlier immigrants almost insen-
sitive or somewhat complementary to immigration flows. This also corresponded
to moderate effects on the labour market outcomes of the two groups: Card’s
findings are consistent with a negative, but very modest, impact of immigration.
In cities with a high immigrant concentration, the negative impact on wages and
employment of low-skilled workers is about 3%.
Along these lines, Borjas (2003) develops a CES-type structural model where
the national labour market is segmented into nested education and experience
cells. The advantage of his framework is that it allows for imperfect substitutabil-
ity between and within education groups. Using data from four Censuses from
1960 to 1990, Borjas first estimates the elasticities of substitutions for each skill
group and then simulates the effects of immigration on wages. His results imply
that an immigration inflow that induces a 10% increase in the labour supply
reduces wages by 4% on average and by 9% for high school dropouts. Using
USA Census data from 1960 to 2000 and a framework similar to the previous
one, Borjas (2006) finds analogous wage impacts of immigration. He estimates
a series of models that correlate the migration rates of natives with immigra-
tion within each region/skill group. As in his earlier work, skills are broken
down by education and experience groups, while labour markets are represented
by Metropolitan Areas, States and Census Divisions. Borjas finds evidence of a
substantial displacement effect: the estimates of the model for internal migration
show that, for any 100 additional immigrants in each region/skill cell, between
20 and 60 natives migrate towards areas with lower immigration concentration,
with effects that increase with the size of the labour market.
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Borjas’ results have been criticised by Sparber and Peri (2007) on the grounds
that, in the set of estimated equations, there exists a mechanical negative corre-
lation between the response variable (log employment) and the main migration
explanatory variable (immigration rate). They prove this by simulating results
using arbitrary values of such correlation. They also estimate alternative specifi-
cations with the same data used by Borjas and find no evidence of displacement;
instead, they found that an increase of 100 immigrants in each region/skill cell
is accompanied by an increase of 30 to 40 natives.
There are only a few studies that explore the displacement effect of immigra-
tion outside the USA context. Stillman and Mare´ (2007) consider the case of
New Zealand: using data from 1996 and 2001 Census at local labour market
area (LMA) level and an econometric framework similar to Borjas (2006), they
estimate the impact of immigration on internal movements of natives and ear-
lier immigrants. They use two different definitions of skill groups: one based on
age/qualification and one based on occupations. Endogeneity issues are mitigated
by using the instrumental variable approach proposed by Card (2001). Their re-
sults indicate no evidence of displacement for natives or earlier immigrants; in
each LMA/skill group, population grows at a rate higher than immigration, im-
plying that both previous residents and new immigrants move to the same areas.
These results are robust across different types of labour market definitions.
To date, only a few studies have investigated the displacement effect in the UK.
Hatton and Tani (2005) build a model where net internal flows between regions
are a function of the net international migration. They use data from the IPS
and from the National Health Service Central Register (NHSCR) for the period
1982-2000. One advantage of their dataset is that it is possible to exploit time
series variation, which allows a better control for persistent demand shocks; an-
other benefit is that emigration rates can be included in the analysis. These
data, however, also have some issues. IPS are only available at regional level,
with no breakdowns by skill, and they are constructed using a sample of 0.2%
of all travellers into and out of the UK22. NHSCR are high-frequency data, but
they only contain information about age and sex of migrants, with some issues
of undercounting of young males23. With these caveats, they estimate a series
22This corresponds to roughly 250,000 interviews annually, see ONS website
http://www.statistics.gov.uk
23The undercounting of young males creates potentially biased estimates if the age and/or
sex distribution of migrants varies by areas. Tabulations at regional level from SAR reveal
that age profiles are different from the average profile (i.e., at country level), particularly in the
case of London. Since this region has a large proportion of immigrants and internal migrants,
migration rates will be measured with error.
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of models, with and without control variables such as house prices and job va-
cancies, and they found that net internal migration is negatively correlated with
the net immigration to the region. However, this effect is significant only when
restricted to the Southern Regions (which are high immigration areas); according
to their estimates, for an additional 100 (net) immigrants, more than 50 previous
residents will move to another region.
Lemos and Portes (2008) analyse the impact that immigration from the East-
ern European countries that recently joined the European Union has on the UK
labour market. They use data from the Worker Registration Scheme and the Na-
tional Insurance Number (NINO) Registrations database. These datasets have
the advantage of being published at LAD level, allowing a detailed study of local
labour markets. They first estimate the impact of immigration on wages and
unemployment, finding no significant adverse effect even for the low-skilled or
young labour force. They then investigate whether immigration leads to a dis-
placement of the native labour force. The results of their preferred specification
confirm the findings of Hatton and Tani (2005), although the magnitude of dis-
placement effect is substantially smaller (between 4 and 9%, for LADs and region,
respectively). These results are vulnerable to criticism for two reasons: first of
all, the displacement hypothesis is tested using the aggregated population, with-
out skill or occupation breakdown. Second, as pointed out also by the authors,
the issue of endogeneity has not been addressed, and hence local demand shocks
are likely to bias the true effect.
Set aside from the studies of displacement effect is the work of Manacorda et al.
(2008). This study is relevant as it offers an alternative explanation for the ab-
sence of immigration effects: the imperfect substitutability between immigrants
and natives. Using data from the GHS and the LFS for the period 1973 to 2005,
they first estimate the elasticity of substitution between immigrants and natives
and then simulate the impact of immigration on the wages of both natives and
the previous cohorts of immigrants. They conclude that, in the period under ex-
amination, immigration increases the wage differential between native and earlier
immigrants by about 5.5%. An important corollary of imperfect substitutability
is that, since competition between new and earlier immigrants is stronger than
between new immigrants and natives, the displacement effects should be larger
among previous cohorts of foreign-born persons.
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The model combines those of Card (2001), Card and Lemieux (2001) and Bor-
jas (2003). Each LAD j produces a single output by the means of the following
technology:
Yj = LαjK1−αj ,
where K and L represent capital and labour, respectively. In each LAD, labour
is a CES-type aggregate of inputs represented by schooling qualification groups
s:
Lj = (∑
s
νjsL
ρ−1
ρ
js ) ρρ−1 ,
where νjs represent LAD/qualification relative efficiency, with ∑s νjs = 1 and ρ
is the elasticity of substitution between qualifications. Each of these inputs is an
aggregate of imperfect substitutable types of labour, represented by age intervals
a:
Ljs = (∑
a
λsaL
δ−1
δ
jsa ) δδ−1 ,
where λsa corresponds to qualification/age relative efficiency, ∑a λsa = 1 and δ
is the elasticity of substitution across age groups. Within each qualification/age
cell, natives (N) and migrants (M) are imperfect substitutes:
Ljsa = (∑
k
ψjsakL
η−1
η
jsak) ηη−1 ,
where k ∈ {N,M}, ψjsak and η are the relative efficiency and the elasticity of sub-
stitution between immigrants and natives, respectively, with ∑k ψjsak = 1. This
feature follows the works of Ottaviano and Peri (2006a) and Manacorda et al.
(2008). Cultural diversity, ethnic segregation, language gap and other factors
could determine different productivity and occupational choices for immigrants,
hence resulting in their imperfect substitutability with natives. Profit maximi-
sation yields the following equation for the marginal product of natives’ and
migrants’ labour inputs (see Appendix):
lnwjsak = ln(qj ∂Yj
∂Lj
)+1
ρ
lnLj+(1
δ
−1
ρ
) lnLjs+(1
η
−1
δ
) lnLjsa− 1
η
lnLjsak+κ, (3.1)
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where κ = lnνjs + lnλsa + lnψjsak and qj is the price of the output in each LAD.
The labour participation function is expressed as follows:
lnLjsak = ε lnwjsak + lnPjsak, (3.2)
where P represents the working-age population in each LAD/qualification/age
cell for both natives and migrants, and ε is the elasticity of labour supply which,
for simplicity, is assumed to be constant across groups. By combining equations
3.1 and 3.2, the following expressions for wage and employment are obtained:
lnwjsak = η
ε + η{ ln(qj ∂Yj∂Lj )+1ρ lnLj+(1δ−1ρ) lnLjs+(1η−1δ) lnLjsa+κ}− 1ε + η lnPjsak
(3.3)
ln
Ljsak
Pjsak
= εη
ε + η{ ln(qj ∂Yj∂Lj )+1ρ lnLj+(1δ−1ρ) lnLjs+(1η−1δ) lnLjsa+κ}− εε + η lnPjsak
(3.4)
Notice that these expressions are very similar to Card (2001) and Borjas (2003)
when η → 0. A percentage increase in the working-age population of migrants
(d lnPjsaM) affects the equilibrium wage and employment of migrants and natives
in the same qualification/age group, but also of migrants and natives in other
qualification/age groups. The total effect for a city is found by considering the
impact on different education and age cells. Following Ottaviano and Peri (2006a)
and assuming that the capital-labour ratio in the short run is not affected by
immigration, it is possible to express the effects of the inflows of immigrants on
a given qualification and age group in each LAD as follows:
d lnwjsaN
d lnPjsaM
= η
ε + η{1ρ∑s ∑a ∂ lnLj∂ lnPjsaM´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶+
+ pi∑
a
∂ lnLjs
∂ lnPjsaM´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶+
+µ ∂ lnLjsa
∂ lnPjsaM´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶+
} (3.5)
d ln(LjsaNPjsaN )
d lnPjsaM
= εη
ε + η{1ρ∑s ∑a ∂ lnLj∂ lnPjsaM´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶+
+ pi∑
a
∂ lnLjs
∂ lnPjsaM´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶+
+µ ∂ lnLjsa
∂ lnPjsaM´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶+
} (3.6)
The terms pi = 1δ − 1ρ and µ = 1η − 1δ are both negative as long as the elasticity
within group is larger than the elasticity between groups, i.e., η > δ > ρ, which is
a standard assumption in similar models. The Appendix shows that the compo-
nents
∂ lnLj
∂ lnPjsak
,
∂ lnLjs
∂ lnPjsak
and
∂ lnLjsa
∂ lnPjsak
are all positive.
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The corresponding effects for earlier immigrants are:
d lnwjsaM
d lnPjsaM
= η
ε + η{1ρ∑s ∑a ∂ lnLj∂ lnPjsaM´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶+
+ pi∑
a
∂ lnLjs
∂ lnPjsaM´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶+
+µ ∂ lnLjsa
∂ lnPjsaM´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶+
−1
η
} (3.7)
d ln(LjsaMPjsaM )
d lnPjsaM
= εη
ε + η{1ρ∑s ∑a ∂ lnLj∂ lnPjsaM´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶+
+ pi∑
a
∂ lnLjs
∂ lnPjsaM´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶+
+µ ∂ lnLjsa
∂ lnPjsaM´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶+
−1
η
} (3.8)
Equations 3.5 to 3.8 summarise the important aspect that immigration in a given
qualification/age group also affects other qualification and age groups. Some
observations are necessary:
1. other things being equal and as long as there is no perfect substitution
between immigrants and natives (i.e., η <∞), then d lnwjsaNd lnPjsaM > d lnwjsaMd lnPjsaM and
d ln(LjsaNPjsaN )
d lnPjsaM
> d ln(LjsaMPjsaM )d lnPjsaM , i.e., the adverse effect of immigration is worse for
immigrants because they are perfect substitutes with newcomers;
2. the sign of both expressions is ambiguous, as there are positive and nega-
tive terms. As noted by Ottaviano and Peri (2006a), the expression might
be positive when the components
∂ lnLj
∂ lnPjsaM
are particularly large, i.e., there
is a large spillover to the total labour force caused by imperfect substi-
tutability. In all other cases the effect will be negative due to the crowding
out of similar workers. A corollary to equations 3.5 to 3.8 is that the im-
pact of immigration on wages and employment depends on how the skills
distribution of new immigrants compares to that of previous residents. If
previous residents have skills similar to immigrants, the negative effects
will be relatively large.
3. a plausible assumption is that previous residents respond to the total effect
of immigration. Natives and earlier immigrants of a given qualification/age
group will migrate to (out of) a LAD if the total effect of immigration on
their wage and employment outcomes is positive (negative). Hence the
correlation between internal migration and immigration of a given qualifi-
cation/age group captures the combined effects across and within groups.
The empirical analysis of the Chapter will assess the effect of an increase in the
supply of immigrants on the mobility of natives and earlier migrants in the same
LAD/qualification/age group.
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The econometric framework is based on Card (2001), with the distinction of
considering that the labour market is segmented in qualification and age groups
rather than occupations. The starting point is the definition of population growth
between 2000 and 2001. In each qualification/age group, natives and migrant
working-age populations grow according to the following equation:
P 2001jN = P 2000jN + PLjN − POjN ,
P 2001jM = P 2000jM + PLjM − POjM ,
where L and O represent indices for in-migration and out-migration across LADs,
respectively. By indicating with Rj the immigration flows in the LAD, total
population growth is represented by:
P 2001j
P 2000j
= 1 + PLjN − POjN
P 2000jN + P 2000jM + P
L
jM − POjM
P 2000jN + P 2000jM + RjP 2000jN + P 2000jM= 1 + njej +mj(1 − ej) + rj (3.9)
where nj = PLjN−POjNP 2000jN ; mj = PLjM−POjMP 2000jM ; ej = P 2000jNP 2000jN +P 2000jM . The growth rate is expressed
as a linear combination of net internal migration rates of natives and earlier
immigrants (nj and mj, respectively) where the weights correspond to the rel-
ative shares (ej and 1 − ej) of the two groups. Equation 3.9 assumes that the
working-age population of previous residents is constant between 2000 and 2001.
If natives and migrants of a given qualification/age group are insensitive to im-
migration flows, then njej +mj(1 − ej) + rj = rj, i.e., the local population grows
only because of immigration.
The estimation of this equation involves potential endogenous issues arising from
the presence of unobserved LAD- and/or qualification/age-specific shocks that
are correlated with the immigration rate. A strategy to control for group-specific
shocks is to pool observations over all qualification and age groups and introduce
fixed effects; however, LAD/qualification/age-specific demand shocks might still
be correlated with rjsa. Endogeneity bias can be mitigated by using an instru-
ment that is orthogonal to local demand shocks. As discussed in Card (2001), a
robust instrument is constituted by country of birth-specific historical settlement
of immigrants. This can be used to predict the part of current immigration flows
that is exogenous to contemporaneous demand conditions.
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The instrument is represented by the following expression:
Rjsa = Rˆjsa + ξjsa =∑
b
γjbθsabRb + ξjsa (3.10)
where γjb is the fraction of historical flows from country b that settled in local
authority j, θsab represents the countrywide share of current migrants belonging
to qualification s and age a, and Rb represents the current flows from country
b. The term Rˆjsa predicts how current immigration flows would be redistributed
across LADs and qualification and age groups in the absence of local demand
shocks, represented by ξjsa. Hence the key identifying assumptions are:
E{γjb, θsab,Rb∣ξjsa} = 0 (3.11)
The instrumental variable approach just described has been extensively used in
the migration literature. In this Chapter, an instrument based on ethnic-specific
historical settlement of immigrants is proposed in addition to the one based on
country of birth. This is thought to be more appropriate for the UK, given the
tendency of immigrants to cluster in ethnic enclaves and due to the fact that
different ethnic groups may originate from the same country of birth. As will
be discussed in the Section 3.6, both instruments yield similar results. Using
equation 3.9, it is possible to express the components of population growth (i.e.,
in-migration, out-migration and net migration) as functions of rj for both natives
and earlier immigrants. By implementing the instrumental variables approach,
the following reduced form regression can be estimated:
gjsa = βrjsa +Zjsaχ + τj + τs + τa + τsa + υjsa (3.12)
where gjsa is a component of population growth (inflow, outflow, net migration
rates) for natives and earlier immigrants; τj, τs and τa represent LAD, qualifica-
tion and age effects; the interaction τsa is used to control for the fact that age
is only a proxy of potential experience, which can vary substantially within each
qualification cell; Z is a set of variables to control for local demand shocks. 24.
The parameter of interest is β, which captures the effect of immigration on the
various components of population growth.
24Equation 3.12 is the baseline for estimation. The analysis has been carried out also using
the model gjsa = βrjsa+Zjsaχ+τj +τs+τa+τjs+τsa+υjsa where τjs represents the interaction
between LAD and qualification. This second specification, which is similar to Borjas (2003),
yields consistent results across all models. Computation of F -tests across alternative models
reveals that numerous interactions reduce the robustness of the instrument. Hence specification
3.12 is an optimal balance between a parsimonious model and a good fit.
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Data used in the analysis come from several sources. The main source is the
Census Table C0949, which has been commissioned from the Office for National
Statistics (ONS). This table contains counts of migrants between LADs of Eng-
land and Wales cross-tabulated by highest level of schooling qualification, age
and foreign-born status, i.e., individuals born inside or outside the UK25. This
table is used to construct in-migration, out-migration, net migration, and immi-
grant flows in England and Wales. Table C0949 has the important feature of not
being especially contaminated by random small cell adjustment, which is usually
implemented by ONS in all tabular outputs to prevent the release of confidential
information.
Another important source of data is the Controlled Access Microdata Sample
(CAMS). This consists of sample microdata from Census, only accessible in
safe settings at ONS, which contains more detailed and disclosive information
than the Samples of Anonymised Records (SARs) and the Small Area Micro-
data (SAM), which are available under end-user licence. CAMS data are used
to derive LAD/skill-specific covariates for both natives and earlier immigrants.
These include the unemployment rate, the share of non-white population, the
proportion of Council houses, the percentage of females and the proportion of
foreign-born population in each LAD/qualification/age group (the last variable
is the same for natives and earlier immigrants).
The remaining information comes from different Census sources: Census Table
C0736 is used to derive the population one year before the Census, which serves
to construct migration rates. Information such as ethnic group and country of
birth of immigrants, necessary to derive the instrumental variable, is obtained
from Tables MG103 and C0737, while historical immigrants’ settlements are de-
rived from 1991 Census Table L06 and L07. Population excluding students has
been estimated using data from Census Table MG105.
25Persons born in Scotland or Northern Ireland are considered natives although these two
countries are excluded from the analysis. The choice of the UK rather than England and Wales
as definition of country of birth is driven by the need to use a harmonised definition across
data sources.
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The base geography is constituted by 374 LADs26. These areas are not uni-
form in terms of population and size: there are LADs with large populations
such as Birmingham and Leeds, and areas far less populous, such as Berwick-
upon-Tweed and Teesdale. London is formed by 32 boroughs, each of them cor-
responding to a LAD. To control for this inhomogeneous size, the analysis will
be based on weighted regressions, using the population in each LAD as weight.
Table C0949 is designed to contain three broad qualification groups: no or other
schooling qualifications, low qualifications (i.e., below A-level) and high qualifi-
cations; these correspond to aggregated Census categories27. There are two im-
portant observations about these definitions. First, the group with no or other
qualifications could be affected by measurement issues if schooling qualifications
were erroneously reported as “other”; this problem could be quite significant for
the group of immigrants, due to difficulties in translating foreign schooling de-
grees into the UK system. However, as discussed by Manacorda et al. (2008),
this issue affects mainly survey data, while the impact is thought to be negligible
for Census data. Second, although the A-level threshold between low and high
qualification is somewhat arbitrary, it is useful to isolate the low-skilled group;
this also corresponds to the classification used in several UK studies of migration,
such as Dustmann et al. (2005).
Three age categories are then nested into each qualification group: 16 to 24, 25
to 44 and 45 to 64 years old. Age groups are only a broad proxy for labour
experience; a finer definition would require knowledge of the age at which indi-
viduals left full-time education, which is not available from Census tabulations.
Nevertheless, these three age intervals are useful to capture different migration
events over the life cycle: the group 16-24 includes movements of the young and
inexperienced labour force; the group 25-44 contains migrations up to the stages
of career development, mostly characterised by movements of the whole house-
26England and Wales are formed by 376 LADs. Due to their relatively small size, the local
authorities of City of London and Isles of Scilly have been aggregated with Westminster and
Penwith, respectively.
27“No or other qualification” includes: No academic, vocational or professional qualifications.
Other qualifications/level unknown: Other qualifications (e.g., City and Guilds; RSA/OCR;
BTEC/Edexcel); Other Professional Qualifications. “Low qualification” include 1+ ’O’ lev-
els/CSE/GCSE (any grade); NVQ level 1; Foundation GNVQ; 5+ ’O’ levels; 5+ CSEs (grade
1); 5+ GCSEs (grade A - C); School Certificate; 1+ A levels/AS levels; NVQ level 2; Interme-
diate GNVQ or equivalents. “High qualifications” include 2+ ’A’ levels; 4+ AS levels; Higher
School Certificate; NVQ level 3; Advanced GNVQ or equivalents; First degree; Higher Degree;
NVQ levels 4 − 5; HNC; HND; Qualified Teacher Status; Qualified Medical Doctor; Qualified
Dentist; Qualified Nurse; Midwife; Health Visitor or equivalents. All categories are derived
from the 2001 Census question “Highest level of qualification”.
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hold; the group 45-64 tracks patterns of career change or pre-retirement. The
other advantage of this classification is that it can be perfectly matched with the
age groups contained in other data sources, such as SARs. Occupations, which
are used in some computations, are defined according to the SOC2000 9 major
groups or the 81 minor groups.
The analysis focuses on flows of working-age populations, which consist of labour
force and inactive persons aged 16 to 64, including students; this is different to
the approach followed by Stillman and Mare´ (2007) which exclude them. Since a
substantial share of students belong to the labour force, their inclusion is useful
to account for the potential impact exerted on the labour market by this group28.
Sensitivity tests to compare results without student population are carried out.
The word immigrant (or new immigrant) is used to indicate a foreign-born indi-
vidual who moved to the UK during the year before the Census date. UK-born
immigrants who moved to England and Wales are excluded. Earlier immigrants
consist of foreign-born persons who migrated into the UK more than one year
before the 2001 Census. Natives include individuals who are born within the
United Kingdom. In-migration and out-migration consist of counts of internal
movements between LADs in England and Wales. These flows can either accrue
to natives or foreign-born persons; net migration is the difference between in-
migration and out-migration.
In each LAD/qualification/age group, the immigration rate is defined as the
count of new immigrants over the total population before immigration. Total
population growth is defined as the ratio of population in 2001 over the popu-
lation in 2000. Migration rates for natives and earlier immigrants correspond to
the ratio of the flows over their respective populations in 2000, e.g., native out-
migration is derived as the ratio of internal outflows of natives over the native
population in 2000.
3.5.2 Some facts about migration in England and Wales
Immigration to England and Wales increased rapidly during the 1990s, while
emigration was fairly stable. The resulting increase in the stock of foreign-born
persons between 1990 and 2000 accounted for half of the population growth in
these two countries. Figure 3.1 presents immigration, emigration and net immi-
gration in England and Wales for the period 1991-2006. The analysis contained
in this Chapter focuses only on immigration of foreign-born persons, and does
28According to 2001 Census data, 22% of new immigrants and 36% of previous residents who
are full-time students are also either working or actively seeking for jobs.
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not consider emigration patterns. This approach is different from Hatton and
Tani (2005), who consider net migration rates; however, as shown in the Figure,
which is constructed using IPS data for the period 1991-2006, international net
migration is mostly driven by immigration patterns, at least at aggregate level.
The other component of international migration - the immigration of UK-born
persons - is set out in the right-hand side of the Figure. As can be seen, aggre-
gate patterns are stable over time. As discussed earlier, these flows will not be
considered.
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Figure 3.1: Immigration flows of foreign-born and natives, thousands. Source: IPS
Table 3.1 reports the distributions of immigrants, total population, natives and
earlier immigrants by qualification and age, occupation and LAD of residence
in 2001. In the year preceding the 2001 Census, more than 220,000 immigrants
aged 16 to 64 moved to England and Wales; this flow corresponds to roughly
0.67% of the total residents before immigration. The skill composition of new
immigrants is very different from that of the resident population. More than
70% of new immigrants are highly qualified, while this percentage is much lower
for the other two groups (43.5% for earlier immigrants and 28% for natives).
Less-qualified persons constitute the largest share of natives (about 41%), while
accounting only for 24% of earlier immigrants and 13% of new immigrants. On
the other hand, the share with no/other qualifications among natives and ear-
lier immigrants is two times larger than for immigrants. Within each educational
group, the age profile reveals that more than 90% of new immigrants are younger
than 44 years. For the groups of earlier immigrants and natives, this percentage
is about 70% for low or high qualifications, and falls to about 40% for the cate-
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gory of no/other qualifications. To provide insight into the distribution of new
immigrants, the Appendix reports a graphical representation of the immigration
rates for different groups.
The occupation profiles are also very different across groups29. More than 56%
of recent immigrants are in the managerial and professional occupations, while
this percentage falls to about 43% for earlier immigrants and less than 36% for
natives. Only 3% of immigrants are in the processing and machine-operating
occupations, while this share is three times larger for earlier immigrants and
natives. The percentage in elementary occupations is similar across the three
groups.
The shares of total population of each group which accrue to the top ten pop-
ulated LADs are set out in the bottom part of the table. These LADs include
more than 12% of recent immigrants, 13.5% of earlier immigrants and 9% of
natives. The top LAD for all three groups is Birmingham, but the share of ear-
lier immigrants is twice as much as that of natives. Interestingly, the shares of
new immigrants are very different to those of earlier immigrants in all LADs,
while in the case of four top LADs (Leeds, Sheffield, Bradford and Liverpool)
they are similar to natives. Among the reasons that could explain this is the
fact that earlier immigrants have moved out of the LADs where they firstly ar-
rived. The figures for the total population resemble very much the profile for
natives, except for certain LADs where the concentration of earlier immigrants
is particularly large. For example, the percentage of poorly-educated individuals
in the total population is slightly smaller than among natives, (39 vs 41%), due
to the fact that the proportion of low-skilled persons among earlier immigrants
is substantially lower than natives. The same argument applies to those LADs
with percentages that differ between the total population and natives. For ex-
ample, the shares of total population of Birmingham and Ealing are relatively
larger compared to those of natives, due to the high concentration of earlier
immigrants. The occupation profile is nearly identical between natives and the
total population.
A preliminary description of the relationship between immigration and internal
movements is set out in Table 3.2. This table reports, in descending order of
flows, the LADs with largest immigration and internal migration for the groups
with low and high qualifications. With the exception of Birmingham, all des-
tinations for poorly-educated new immigrants are situated in London. Six out
of ten of such LADs are also top destinations for earlier immigrants. However,
29The definition of SOC2000 occupation groups can be found in the ONS website
http://www.ons.gov.uk/about-statistics/classifications/current/ns-sec
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eight out of ten of the main origins of internal migration are also among the
London boroughs. With few exceptions, the top origins and destinations of low-
qualified natives differ from those of new immigrants and are situated mainly in
the Metropolitan Counties (e.g., Manchester and Leeds).
Table 3.1: Skill distribution and geographic dispersion for different groups
Recent Earlier Natives Total
immigrants immigrants population
Total 222,942 3,374,241 29,726,880 33,324,063
Qualification Age
No/other qualif. 15.9 32.4 31.2 31.2
16-24 49.3 9.6 9.6 8.5
25-44 41.7 27.7 29.0 40.2
45-64 9.0 62.7 61.3 51.3
Low qualif. 13.1 24.1 40.8 39.0
16-24 52.6 21.5 21.5 19.9
25-44 40.0 54.3 54.0 50.9
45-64 7.4 24.2 24.5 29.2
High qualif. 70.9 43.5 28.0 29.8
16-24 32.1 20.0 19.2 13.3
25-44 60.6 50.9 52.1 58.1
45-64 7.2 29.1 28.7 28.7
Occupations
Managers and senior officials 13.1 14.9 13.6 13.7
Professional occup. 23.2 14.0 9.6 10.1
Ass. profess. and technical occup. 19.6 13.7 12.4 12.6
Administrative and secretarial occup. 12.1 12.2 13.7 13.6
Skilled trades occup. 4.3 8.6 11.3 11.0
Personal service occup. 6.7 6.8 7.5 7.4
Sales and customer service occup. 6.0 7.5 8.8 8.7
Process, plant and machine operatives 2.8 8.7 9.0 8.9
Elementary occup. 12.3 13.6 14.1 14.1
Top ten populated LAD
Birmingham 2.10 3.48 1.63 1.82
Leeds 1.42 0.99 1.44 1.39
Sheffield 1.08 0.67 1.03 1.00
Bradford 0.75 1.23 0.83 0.87
Liverpool 0.72 0.41 0.90 0.85
Manchester 1.65 1.18 0.73 0.78
Bristol 1.11 0.66 0.76 0.76
Kirklees 0.34 0.69 0.75 0.74
Croydon 0.92 1.64 0.53 0.65
Ealing 1.94 2.52 0.40 0.62
Source: Census Table C0949 and C0737. Occupations defined according to SOC2000.
For the group with high qualifications, the majority of destinations for new immi-
grants are situated in London, but the list also includes Oxford and Cambridge.
Another interesting aspect is that the ranking of the destinations within London
is somewhat inverted: while the top LADs for low-qualified immigrants are lo-
cated in Outer London, those for the highly qualified belong to the inner part.
A similar ranking is found in the migration patterns of earlier immigrants, with
both top destinations and origin in the Inner London area. The migration pat-
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tern of highly qualified natives is rather diverse, with four of the top origins and
destinations located mostly in Inner London and the rest situated in areas similar
to those of low-qualified natives. The descriptive evidence in Table 3.2 reveals
that migration patterns differ substantially by qualification group and country
of birth; moreover, it reiterates the importance of analysing the relationships
between immigration and internal migration at LAD level.
3.5.3 Assessing the substitution of skill groups
The model in Section 3.4 is built on the assumption that there is imperfect
substitution between qualification and age groups. The nested structure of the
model suggests that substitutability is larger within groups and smaller between;
this corresponds to the findings of works such as Borjas (2003). The model also
assumes that immigrants and natives are imperfect substitutes in the same age
cell. This feature was recently incorporated into structural models for the case
of the USA by Ottaviano and Peri (2006a), who estimated an elasticity of sub-
stitution between 5 and 6 and for the UK by Manacorda et al. (2008), who found
a value of about 7.
There is no single metric to gauge the substitution between and across groups;
a simple and effective method, used previously by Borjas (2003) and Ottaviano
and Peri (2006a), is to construct an index of congruence on the lines of that
originally proposed by Welch (1999), which measures the affinity in the occupa-
tional distributions of different groups. The rationale is that groups composed
of individuals with similar occupations are closer substitutes than groups with
dissimilar distributions, and hence face higher competition in the labour market.
The index of congruence is:
Fhl = ∑g (fhg−fg)(flg−fg)fg√∑g (fhg−fg)2fg ∑g (flg−fg)2fg ,
with Fhl ∈ [−1,1]. Here fhg and flg are the shares of group h and l in occupation
g. The term fg is the proportion of total population in occupation g. The index
is constructed in a way such that Fhl = 1 if occupations of group h have the exact
distribution of group l and Fhl = −1 if the two groups have completely different
distributions. It is possible to construct this index for all the sub-aggregates of
the labour input.
Table 3 reports the value of Fhl between natives and earlier immigrants within
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the same education and age group. The index is calculated using the 81 minor
groups (three digit) of the SOC2000. The congruence index between natives
equals 1 for individuals in the same qualification/age group and is larger for
contiguous cells. For example, for the group of low-skilled, the index between
natives aged 16-24 and 25-44 is 0.22 and between those aged 25-44 and 45-64 it
is 0.55, while the index between natives aged 16-24 and 45-64 is −0.31, revealing
a smaller degree of substitution. The degree of substitution across qualification
groups can be assessed in a similar way. Cells that are relatively far from the
diagonal have relatively smaller values, indicating less substitutability between
different groups. The imperfect substitution between natives and immigrants is
observed along the diagonal of the lower panel of Table 3.3. The index ranges
from 0.60 to 0.94, indicating imperfect substitution between the two groups. In
general, values are larger for the highly qualified than for the low-qualified.
Table 3.3: Congruence index between natives and immigrants
Natives
No/other qualif. Low qualif. High qualif.
16-24 25-44 45-64 16-24 25-44 45-64 16-24 25-44 45-44
Natives
16-24 1.00
No/other qualif. 25-44 0.75 1.00
45-64 0.52 0.90 1.00
16-24 0.75 0.32 0.17 1.00
Low qualif. 25-44 0.01 0.11 0.23 0.22 1.00
45-64 -0.56 -0.45 -0.16 -0.31 0.55 1.00
16-24 0.19 -0.30 -0.41 0.68 0.03 -0.09 1.00
High qualif. 25-44 -0.65 -0.76 -0.81 -0.58 -0.54 0.00 0.02 1.00
45-44 -0.53 -0.60 -0.64 -0.55 -0.71 -0.13 -0.16 0.81 1.00
Immigrants
16-24 0.76 0.48 0.29 0.66 -0.04 -0.41 0.32 -0.51 -0.41
No/other qualif. 25-44 0.52 0.60 0.53 0.29 0.02 -0.31 -0.12 -0.54 -0.42
45-64 0.54 0.79 0.79 0.16 0.06 -0.26 -0.34 -0.67 -0.50
16-24 0.64 0.22 0.10 0.94 0.12 -0.26 0.73 -0.50 -0.48
Low qualif. 25-44 0.09 0.09 0.20 0.35 0.65 0.43 0.22 -0.52 -0.61
45-64 -0.27 -0.13 0.12 -0.14 0.49 0.77 -0.12 -0.27 -0.30
16-24 0.14 -0.34 -0.43 0.57 -0.11 -0.09 0.94 0.09 -0.09
High qualif. 25-44 -0.54 -0.67 -0.73 -0.47 -0.54 -0.07 0.09 0.87 0.61
45-44 -0.51 -0.58 -0.60 -0.52 -0.68 -0.14 -0.16 0.78 0.81
Source: SARs. The two panels refer to total resident population in 2000.
3.6 Analysis
In the analysis, the increase in the supply of migrants is represented by the im-
migration rate, defined as the number of immigrants in a LAD/qualification/age
cell over the resident population in the same cell. The response of previous res-
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idents to immigration can be gauged by their propensity to enter or tendency
to leave the local labour market, which is represented by the in-migration and
out-migration rate, respectively, or by the net migration rate. A useful starting
point for the analysis can be effectively made by representing the raw correlation
between the immigration rate and the net migration of the groups of interest.
Using the prediction of the identity 3.9 and the reduced form 3.12, a regression
of total population growth on rjsa will yield a coefficient of 1 with an intercept of
1 in case immigration does not cause displacement. Figure 3.2 uses observations
for the 374 LADs in England and Wales for all qualification/age groups to com-
pare the case of no off-setting migration with the fitted values derived from the
simplest version of equation 3.12. Regressions use the populations in each LAD
as weights. The resulting coefficient is 1.568 (s.e. 0.048), with R2 = 0.24; for
the un-weighted OLS, these values are somewhat smaller (1.314, s.e. 0.055 and
R2 = 0.14). It can be seen that even at levels with relatively large immigration,
there is no evidence of a negative effect.
These patterns are, however, aggregate; hence it is useful to consider the effects
of immigration flows on the groups of natives and earlier immigrants. Figure 3.3
represents scatter plots of net internal migration of these two groups against the
immigration rate.
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Figure 3.2: Total population growth and immigration, weighted estimates, all groups
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Figure 3.3: Net internal migration and immigration, weighted estimates, all groups
3.6.1 Estimation Results
The present Subsection contains the results of the estimation of the model
in equation 3.12 for a series of alternative specifications. Robustness checks are
carried out in the next Section.
The first two columns of Table 3.4 contain the estimates for the cases of stan-
dard and weighted OLS, where the weights are represented by the size of the
population in each LAD. All migration rates for natives are significant at the
0.1% level. In-migration rates are high, implying that for every new immigrant,
nearly 3 natives enter the same LAD; out-migration rates, although high, are just
above 2. As a consequence, the estimated coefficient for net migration, which
is roughly the difference between the in-migration and the out-migration coef-
ficients, is significantly positive. In-migration rates for earlier immigrants are
very similar to those for natives; however, out-migration rates are much larger,
indicating that nearly 3 persons leave for every new immigrant who enters the
local labour market. This yields an estimate for net migration that is essentially
zero, although its sign is sensitive to the type of weights used. The last row
reports the value for population growth; the weighted estimate corresponds to
the dotted line in Figure 3.2. In the rest of the Chapter, results will be presented
for weighted regressions, as weights help adjusting for the inhomogeneous sizes
of LADs and yield better fits. However, the pattern of the results does not sub-
stantially change when un-weighted OLS is used.
Column (c) introduces dummies for each LAD, qualification and age group, with
the aim of controlling for unobservable effects which are specific to each groups.
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The introduction of these fixed effects partially attenuates the coefficient of in-
migration and substantially decreases the coefficient for out-migration. As a
consequence, the estimate for net-migration is highly significant for both natives
and earlier immigrants. These estimates, however, could be affected by the cor-
relation between immigration and LAD/qualification/age specific shocks, hence
creating issues of endogeneity. As an example, an outward shift in the demand
for certain skills in a LAD will attract both immigrants and previous residents,
hence creating upward bias in the estimates of in-migration. As discussed in the
previous Section, this bias can be reduced by instrumenting the current immi-
gration with a flow measure that is independent of current economic conditions.
Table 3.4: Impact of immigration on internal migration
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Natives
In-migration 2.513*** 2.891*** 2.163*** 0.828*** 0.516*** 0.583***
(0.067) (0.067) (0.068) (0.125) (0.133) (0.160)
Out–migration 2.101*** 2.195*** 0.034 –0.218** –0.129 –0.147
(0.085) (0.073) (0.041) (0.071) (0.073) (0.084)
Net-migration 0.412*** 0.697*** 2.129*** 1.047*** 0.645*** 0.731***
(0.055) (0.049) (0.074) (0.133) (0.141) (0.159)
N 3366 3366 3366 3366 3366 2130
Earlier immigrants
In-migration 2.677*** 2.758*** 1.567*** 1.018* 0.880* 1.630***
(0.151) (0.153) (0.237) (0.412) (0.425) (0.195)
Out–migration 2.871*** 2.696*** 0.117 0.694*** 0.942*** 1.927***
(0.135) (0.110) (0.114) (0.198) (0.205) (0.185)
Net-migration –0.194 0.063 1.450*** 0.324 –0.061 –0.298
(0.155) (0.149) (0.240) (0.418) (0.433) (0.189)
N 3366 3366 3366 3366 3366 1045
Population growth 1.314*** 1.568*** 2.931*** 1.799*** 1.419*** 1.476***
(0.055) (0.048) (0.072) (0.130) (0.138) (0.135)
N 3366 3366 3366 3366 3366 2841
OLS/IV OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
Fixed effects N N Y Y Y Y
Weights N Y Y Y Y Y
Controls N N N N N Y
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ significant at 0.1%; ∗∗ significant at 1%; ∗ significant at 5%. The
reported coefficient refers to the immigration rate. Models (b) to (e) are weighted by the population in each
LAD. Model (d) is instrumented by historical settlements of foreign-born by country of birth; models (e) and
(f) by historical settlements of foreign-born by ethnic group. Controls included in (f) are logs of: unemployment
rate, share of non-white population, percentage of Council house and fraction of women for both native and
earlier immigrants group and the share of foreign-born population common to the two groups.
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Specifications (d) and (e) in Table 3.4 include two different instrumental vari-
ables. In (d), the instrument is derived by combining information on the shares of
foreign-born population in 1991 by countries of birth (which corresponds to Rb in
3.10), the share of new immigrants from country of birth in each LAD (γjb) and
the countrywide proportion of immigrants from a given country of birth allocated
to each qualification/age group (θsab)30. As can be seen, the instrumental vari-
able in (d) substantially reduces the estimates, especially those of in-migration.
For natives, the coefficient of net migration is positive and significant; for earlier
immigrants the estimate is positive too, but not significantly different from zero.
Specification (e) proposes another instrument, which is constructed by using in-
formation on ethnicity of immigrants. This is thought to be a refinement of (d)
due to the close relationship, in England and Wales, between immigration and
existing enclaves of the same ethnic group (Stillwell and Duke-Williams, 2005).
The variable is derived in the same fashion as in (d), with the difference that b
represents the ethnic group; Rb is the stock of population in 1991 that belongs to
each ethnic group, γjb the proportion of recent foreign-born immigrants in ethnic
group b and θsab the distribution by ethnic group and skill31.
Table 3.5 reports the results from the first stage for net internal migration for
both instruments. The estimation refers to the full specification (i.e., model (f)
in Table 3.4). The table also contains the partial R2 (Shea, 1997) and the Wald
statistic for weak identification of the instrument (Cragg and Donald, 1993). As
can be seen, the predictive power of the two instruments is substantially similar,
which translates into minor changes in the estimates. In the remaining analysis,
only results based on the ethnic group instrument will be reported.
Column (f) introduces a vector of covariates that aims at controlling for ob-
servable group-specific characteristics in each LAD/qualification/age cell. These
variables are similar to those used in previous studies such as Card (2001) and
Stillman and Mare´ (2007); they are obtained from CAMS data and include unem-
ployment rate, share of non-white population, percentage of females (which vary
for natives and earlier immigrants) and the percentage of foreign-born (which
has the same value for natives and earlier immigrants). As a further control,
the proportion of Council houses in each cell has been added, in order to con-
trol for shocks associated with the housing market. Inspection of the results in
30The countries of birth considered are: Eastern Europe, Western Europe, Africa, South
Asia, Rest of Asia and Other countries. This classification allows a perfect match between
1991 and 2001 Censuses.
31The ethnic groups considered are: White, Blacks, South Asian and Chinese and Other.
The use of broad classes is dictated by the fact that ethnic groups are only partially comparable
between 1991 and 2001, since the ethnic classification experienced major changes.
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column (f) suggests that these variables are important in explaining migration
patterns and have a substantial impact on the estimates. The coefficients of in-
migration and out-migration for natives are much smaller, but the coefficient of
net migration is still significantly positive. This fact suggests that this group is
not adversely affected by immigration; instead, there appears to be a pattern of
complementarity, since natives and immigrants move to the same locations. This
finding is reinforced by the fact that earlier cohorts of foreign-born are displaced
by recent immigrants, as demonstrated by the negative (although not significant)
coefficient for net migration. This result implies that, on average, for every ten
immigrants who enter a given LAD/qualification/age cell, roughly seven natives
are added to the population, while about three earlier immigrants leave.
Table 3.5: First stage regression of IV estimation
Country of birth Ethnic group
Natives Earlier imm. Natives Earlier imm.
β 0.635∗∗∗ 0.565∗∗∗ 0.647∗∗∗ 0.580∗∗∗
seβ (0.020) (0.028) (0.021) (0.030)
partial R2 0.364 0.355 0.344 0.333
Wald 998.91 407.39 918.70 377.90
N 2130 1045 2130 1045
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ significant at 0.1%; ∗∗ significant at 1%; ∗
significant at 5%. The reported coefficient refers to the first stage regression of historical
settlement of foreign-born by country of birth and historical settlements of foreign-born
by ethnicity, respectively. All regressions are weighted by the population in each LAD
and include fixed LAD, qualification and age effects. The Wald statistic refers to the
test for weak identification of the instrument.
To investigate these findings in more depth, Table 3.6 presents a set of models
that can be considered “restrictions” of the full specification contained in col-
umn (f) of Table 3.4. The first column confines the analysis to the 250 most
populous LADs. The aim is to prevent the results in Table 3.4 being affected by
the measurement error associated with the added covariates, since these might
contain some noise due to small cell size. As can be seen, results are very similar
to those in the last column of Table 3.4. The second column focuses on the top
150 destinations for immigrants. These include 87% of new immigrants, 82% of
earlier immigrants and 55% of native population. Migration rates for natives are
still sensitive to immigration, but the standard error is too large to reject the null
hypothesis of no effect. On the other hand, the impact on earlier immigrants is
consistent with previous specifications and displacement is larger and significant.
Similar values and signs of the estimates appear for the case of London, although
55
3.6.1 Estimation Results
Table 3.6: Impact of immigration on internal migration - cases
Top 250 Top 150 London South No/other
pop.lad pop.imm boroughs England low qualif.
Natives
In-migration 0.667*** 0.069 0.509 0.407 –0.054
(0.175) (0.236) (0.387) (0.210) (0.062)
Out–migration –0.121 –0.265* 0.067 –0.385*** –0.305***
(0.091) (0.123) (0.142) (0.111) (0.045)
Net-migration 0.788*** 0.335 0.442 0.791*** 0.251***
(0.174) (0.234) (0.344) (0.215) (0.056)
N 1660 1075 280 1143 1432
Earlier immigrants
In-migration 1.619*** 1.629*** 0.476 0.975*** 0.871***
(0.200) (0.214) (0.339) (0.252) (0.141)
Out–migration 1.930*** 2.211*** 0.893*** 1.486*** 1.345***
(0.190) (0.199) (0.216) (0.201) (0.139)
Net-migration –0.311 –0.582** –0.417 –0.511* –0.475**
(0.195) (0.202) (0.267) (0.229) (0.156)
N 947 763 277 633 702
Population growth 1.544*** 0.887*** 1.185*** 1.584*** 1.067***
(0.156) (0.216) (0.308) (0.178) (0.055)
N 2092 1288 288 1510 1902
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ significant at 0.1%; ∗∗ significant at 1%; ∗ significant
at 5%. The reported coefficient refers to the immigration rate instrumented by historical
settlements of foreign-born by ethnic group. All models are weighted by the population in each
LAD and include fixed LAD, qualification and age effects, and the control variables as in Table
3.4 column (f). South England comprises East of England, South East, South West and London.
results are not significant. The fourth column restricts the analysis to the South
of England, an area with relatively high immigration rates. For natives, the es-
timates for in-migration and out-migration are similar to the benchmark case in
Table 3.4; for earlier immigrants, the estimates for in-migration are substantially
lower, yielding a large significant negative coefficient for net migration. The final
column focuses on the group with no, other or low qualifications. The coefficient
for in-migration of natives is negative, although not economically or statistically
significant. The estimate for out-migration is negative too, indicating that the
propensity to leave is inversely related to immigration. This yields a value for
net migration that is positive, although lower than in the benchmark case. Con-
versely, for the case of earlier immigrants, displacement is negative and implies
that an inflow of ten low-skilled immigrants leads to an outflow of five earlier
immigrants.
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3.7 Sensitivity analysis
This Section addresses issues that might affect the estimation. In the first
Subsection, models in Table 3.6 are estimated excluding students, hence elimi-
nating the confounding effect generated by individuals that move solely for ed-
ucational purposes. The second Subsection proposes a definition of local labour
market based on Travel to Work Areas, which prevents commuting patterns being
captured by migration flows. The third Subsection reports the estimates using
bilateral migration flows (i.e., from LAD to LAD), to control for the presence
of origin-destination effects and to analyse intra- and inter-regional flows sep-
arately. Finally, a classification of skill groups based on predicted occupations
as in Card (2001) is introduced. All robustness checks confirm that there is no
displacement for natives; on the other hand, results confirm that some groups of
earlier immigrants move out from LADs in response to recent immigration.
3.7.1 Controlling for student migration
A substantial fraction of immigrants and internal migrants is constituted by
students. Table 3.7 shows that a large proportion of the flows in each qualifica-
tion/age cell are still in education, but with differences across groups.
Table 3.7: Percentage of students for different groups
Internal immigrants Net migration
Recent Natives Earlier Natives Earlier
immigrants immigrants immigrants
Qualification Age
No/other qualif.
16-24 47.0 23.2 39.4 45.9 37.1
25-44 15.8 1.2 6.2 1.0 3.0
45-64 4.3 0.6 1.2 0.2 0.4
Low qualif.
16-24 58.3 24.7 46.3 38.2 55.9
25-44 10.8 1.5 7.5 1.1 3.7
45-64 6.6 0.8 1.8 0.4 0.8
High qualif.
16-24 61.1 53.1 57.7 39.5 58.5
25-44 21.0 3.7 10.9 2.3 8.0
45-64 5.7 1.4 2.5 0.6 1.3
Source: CAMS.
To investigate how student population affects the results, the analysis of the
previous Section is repeated for the non-student population. Since information
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on student status is not available in table C0949, flows of non-student migrants
are estimated by combining data from the Census and from SAM and SARs
microdata. The Appendix describes in detail the algorithm used. Estimation
results are presented in Table 3.8, where results are reported for net migration
only. Although derivation of the non-student population is quite an accurate
procedure, it could still generate some measurement error; as a consequence, this
sensitivity check should be used to compare whether the patterns of Table 3.6
are corroborated rather than to obtain a point estimate of the parameters.
Table 3.8: Impact of immigration on internal migration - excluding students
Top 250 Top 150 London South No/other
pop.lad pop.imm boroughs England low qualif.
Natives
Net-migration 1.200*** 1.313*** 0.355 0.909*** 0.120*
(0.122) (0.152) (0.281) (0.157) (0.052)
N 1508 1003 278 1037 1255
Earlier immigrants
Net-migration 0.266 0.332* –0.689** –0.309 –0.327**
(0.156) (0.166) (0.247) (0.186) (0.124)
N 861 692 264 575 637
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ significant at 0.1%; ∗∗ significant at 1%; ∗ significant
at 5%. Dependent variable is the net migration rate of respective groups. The reported
coefficient refers to the immigration rate instrumented by historical settlements of foreign-born
by ethnic group. All models are weighted by the population in each LAD and include fixed
effects, and the control variables as in Table 3.4 column (f). South England comprises East of
England, South East, South West and London.
Estimates for the 250 most populous LADs show that the coefficient for natives
is larger than that in Table 3.6; this is also true for earlier immigrants, since the
coefficient is now positive (although significant only at 10%). A similar pattern
emerges from the results for the 150 top immigrant LADs. The case of London
is rather interesting: for natives, the impact on net internal migration is positive
but insignificant; in contrast, for earlier immigrants the estimate is statistically
significant, with a magnitude of about 0.70. The coefficients for the South Re-
gions confirm the results of Table 3.6, although only in the case of natives is the
relationship significant. Finally, for the group of no/other or low qualifications,
the coefficient is positive (although small) for natives, while it is negative (al-
though smaller than that in Table 3.6) for earlier immigrants. The conclusion is
that inferences in Table 3.8 are very similar to those presented in Table 3.6.
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A potential drawback with the use of migration data at LAD level is that
movements between LADs could capture a change in the current residence rather
than a movement to a new labour market. As an example, one person could de-
cide to move from a LAD inside London to a peripheral LAD, where house prices
are lower, but continue to work in central London, commuting each day. In this
case, migration flows between LADs will overestimate the flows out of London.
A solution is to use self-contained labour markets, i.e., areas where commuters
live and work. UK Government Office Regions match this definition, but per-
haps in too broad a sense, since there are plenty of sub-regional labour markets
within them. In addition, self-containment at regional level is problematic when
considering areas such as the East of England and the South East, where com-
muting to London may hinder an exact delineation 32. Perhaps the natural size
of a local labour market stands between LADs and regions. Acknowledging this
fact, ONS has derived a geography, the Travel to Work Areas (TTWA), which
correspond to self-contained labour markets. These are constructed by aggre-
gating Lower Super Output Areas (areas with 1,500 people on average) using
commuting data from the 2001 Census. The criteria to define a TTWA include
supply- and demand-side self-containment which correspond, respectively, to the
percentage of employed residents working in the same area and the percentage
of jobs that go to local residents33. There are 186 TTWAs in England and Wales
and, similarly to LADs, these are not homogenous. Perhaps the most striking
case is London, which is considered as a single TTWA. The advantage of using
TTWAs is that they give quite a precise approximation of the local labour mar-
ket; the disadvantage is that their boundaries intersect those of LADs, at which
level most of the statistics are collected34.
To test the sensitivity of the results, the models in Table 3.6 are estimated us-
ing a customised definition of TTWA, henceforth referred as to TTWAD. This
corresponds to TTWAs with boundaries that are adjusted to fully encompass
one or more local authorities. This geography is constructed by matching the
374 LADs with the 186 TTWAs using the employed population in each LSOA
32See:http://www.statistics.gov.uk/about/methodology by theme/labour market/sub nat
lmissues.asp.
33In a “commuting” migration matrix, where “origins” consists of the residence of indi-
viduals and the “destinations” are their workplace, the supply-side self-containment is the
ratio of the diagonal elements to row sum while the demand-side self-containment is the ratio
of the diagonal elements to column sum. A description of the procedure can be found at:
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/geography/ttwa.asp.
34Only recently has ONS started to release labour market indicators also at TTWA level.
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as weight35. Each LADs is divided into shares of employed population to each
TTWA: the largest share determines the pertinence of the LAD to the TTWA36.
The final TTWAD geography consists of 162 areas, since 26 are cancelled out due
to the fact that they are formed by small fractions of LADs. The conversion is
likely to generate some measurement errors, most of which accrue to those LADs
that belong to two or more TTWAs, since it is not possible to distinguish which
part of migration within or between a LAD corresponds to migration between or
within a TTWA. This problem does not exist for LADs completely encompassed
by TTWA boundaries. With this caveat in mind, a measure of the efficacy of the
conversion algorithm is obtained by analysing the change in the measure of self-
containment achieved by using TTWADs rather than LADs. Self-containment for
LADs and TTWADs is calculated using commuting data from the 2001 Census.
The supply-side self-containment across the 374 LADs is 60%, while the demand-
side self-containment is 65%. The TTWAD geography reaches a value of about
76% and 79%, respectively37. Although this value mechanically increases with
fewer areas considered, this derived geography represents local labour markets
well if one considers that supply- and demand-side self-containment for the ONS’
TTWAs are 77% and 81%, respectively. Hence TTWADs are a good approxi-
mation of the current definition of local labour market. As a further refinement,
one of the specifications is restricted to a subsample of TTWADs formed by
LADs with a value of inclusion of at least 50%. Finally, covariates at LAD level
have been aggregated to TTWAD by summing the values in levels and deriving
weighted averages for rates, with weights represented by the populations in 2000.
Table 3.9 contains the results of the estimation using TTWADs. From the es-
timates in the first three columns, it can be seen that the coefficients are much
larger than in Table 3.6. Although part of this fact could be attributed to the
measurement error related to the definition of TTWAD, larger estimated effects
are expected when considering a wider area, as noted by Sparber and Peri (2007).
According to these findings, for every new immigrant who enters the TTWAD,
more than one native is added to the population. The coefficients for earlier im-
migrants are significantly positive, although much smaller than those of natives.
In the case of individuals with no/other or low qualifications, however, the nega-
tive impact is remarkably larger than that in Table 6. This result is substantially
unchanged when only TTWADs that are good overlaps of LADs are considered.
35Employed population excludes full-time students. Using other weights, such as total pop-
ulation or labour force yields exactly the same TTWAD geography.
36There are only 13 cases with LAD shares under 50% attributed to a TTWAD.
37The results do not change when TTWADs are derived using total population rather than
employed population.
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These findings confirm that there is no displacement effect for natives, although
the estimates are somewhat larger than those in Table 3.6. For the case of earlier
immigrants, evidence of displacement is confirmed only for the group with lowest
skills, with a coefficient that is about three times larger.
Table 3.9: Impact of immigration on internal migration - travel to work areas
Top 250 Top 150 South No/other, 50% self
pop.lad imm. LAD England low qualif. contained
Natives
Net-migration 1.995*** 1.823*** 2.659*** 0.346*** 0.306***
(0.150) (0.230) (0.224) (0.060) (0.072)
N 745 415 485 705 462
Earlier immigrants
Net-migration 0.670*** 0.681** 1.134*** –1.471*** –1.489***
(0.189) (0.241) (0.332) (0.318) (0.383)
N 484 321 302 436 313
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ significant at 0.1%; ∗∗ significant at 1%; ∗ significant
at 5%. Dependent variable is the net migration rate of respective groups. The reported
coefficient refers to the immigration rate instrumented by historical settlements of foreign-born
by ethnic group. All models are weighted by the population in each TTWAD and include fixed
effects and the control variables as in Table 3.4. South England comprises East of England,
South East, South West and London.
3.7.3 Place-to-place migration
So far, the analysis has used destination- and origin-specific flows. Each of
these flows can be decomposed into bilateral migrations between LADs so that
it is possible to relate the net migration flows between two LADs with their
difference in the immigration rates. The advantage of segmenting flows in such a
fashion is that it enables controlling for origin-destination fixed effects, allowing
for a further robustness check of the estimates in Table 3.6. These fixed effects
capture the connectivity existing between two specific LADs that is generated by
the existence of similar economic conditions or by the presence of social networks
that link them. Equation 3.12 can be rewritten as follows:
gijsa = βrijsa +Zijsaχ + τ ij + τs + τa + τsa + υijsa (3.13)
Where gijsa represents the net migration rate between LAD j and i (i.e., flows
from i to j minus flows from j to i divided by half the total population of i and j)
in each qualification/age cell; rijsa is the net immigration rate (i.e., immigration
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rate in j minus immigration rate in i); the matrix Z contains differences in the
covariates (expressed in logs); origin-destination fixed effects are captured by τ ij ,
which correspond to a set of dummies for each pair of bilateral flows.
Table 3.10 reports the results of the estimation of equation 3.13 for all models of
Table 3.6. In general, the reported coefficients are smaller in magnitude because,
as discussed in Hatton and Tani (2005), when estimating bilateral net migration
flows, the displacement effect is spread across all other LADs.
Table 3.10: Impact of immigration on internal migration - LAD to LAD flows
Top 250 Top 150 London South No/other, low qual.
pop.lad imm. LAD boroughs England Intra-reg Inter-reg
Natives
Net-migration 0.002 0.004 –0.003 0.003 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
N 81904 38975 3407 45080 14198 58304
Earlier immigrants
Net-migration –0.008** –0.009** –0.015* –0.008* –0.019** –0.014*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007)
N 15723 13086 3250 9823 3022 5530
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ significant at 0.1%; ∗∗ significant at 1%; ∗ significant at
5%. Dependent variable is the net migration rate of respective groups. The reported coefficient
refers to the differential in immigration rates between LADs instrumented by the differential in
historical settlements of foreign-born by ethnic group. All models are weighted by the average
population of LAD pairs and include fixed origin-destination, qualification and age effects, and
control variables as in Table 3.4 (in differences). South England comprises East of England, South
East, South West and London.
In the first column, the coefficient for natives is positive (although significant at
10% only), while the estimate for earlier immigrants is negative and significant.
For the case of 150 top immigrant LADs, results are in line with those of Table
3.6. For London, the effect for natives is slightly negative, but not statistically
significant, while for earlier immigrants there is evidence of displacement, with
quite a substantial impact. The results for the South England show that the es-
timate for natives is positive (significant at 10%), while the coefficient for earlier
immigrants is consistent with that in Table 3.6.
Another important advantage of using origin-destination flows is that it allows
separating between intra- and inter-regional flows. For the estimates of low-
skilled, coefficients are reported for migrations within and between regions. The
impact on natives is essentially zero, while for earlier immigrants there is a sub-
stantial negative effect, consistent with all models previously estimated. Inter-
estingly, the impact for migrants within the region is larger than that between
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regions. This suggests that the effect of immigration on the local labour market
can be substantially different between and within regions. Studies that use re-
gional data usually ignore this difference.
3.7.4 Predicted occupations
To test the sensitivity of the results to the particular type of skill groups
used, in this Subsection an alternative classification using predicted occupations
is proposed. Occupations are derived following the procedure described in Card
(2001); this consists of estimating a multinomial logit model where the probabil-
ity of being in an occupation is modelled using micro-level data. The rationale of
using predicted and not effective occupations is that individuals might shift to a
new occupations (also) in response to immigration. In order to derive predicted
occupation groups, detailed data from CAMS at LAD level have been accessed.
Probabilities are modelled for all the groups of interest (non-movers, internal
migrants and recent immigrants) using information about age, sex, school qual-
ification, ethnic group, country of birth and a dummy for residing in London.
Table 3.11 reports the estimates for net migration of all models in Table 3.6.
Table 3.11: Impact of immigration on internal migration - predicted occupations
Top 250 Top 150 London South Low qualif.
pop.lad pop.imm boroughs England occup.
Natives
Net-migration 0.639*** 0.719* 2.090 1.825*** 0.360*
(0.179) (0.343) (1.096) (0.471) (0.165)
N 1815 1178 287 1269 1008
Earlier immigrants
Net-migration –0.976 –0.921 –1.617* –3.830* –0.298
(0.644) (0.699) (0.699) (1.871) (0.583)
N 865 715 278 598 441
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ significant at 0.1%; ∗∗ significant at 1%; ∗ signifi-
cant at 5%. Dependent variable is the net migration rate of respective groups. The reported
coefficient refers to the immigration rate instrumented by historical settlements of foreign-born
by ethnic group. All models are weighted by the population in each LAD and include fixed
LAD and occupation effects and the control variables as in Table 3.4. Low qualification
occupations are: personal service occupations; sales and customer service occupations; process,
plant and machine operatives; elementary occupations. South England comprises East of
England, South East, South West and London.
Results substantially confirm the empirical evidence contained in Table 3.6, al-
though the estimated coefficients are not directly comparable. In particular, it
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should be noted that the estimated coefficients and their standard errors are
larger than those in Table 3.6, resulting in a lower precision of the estimates.
For all the models of UK-born individuals the coefficient is positive; for the
model of 250 most populous LADs the estimates are close to those of Table 3.6,
while for the model that refers to South England, the coefficient is rather large.
This is somewhat mirrored in the large negatives estimate for earlier immigrants.
Although the remaining estimates for earlier immigrants are not statistically sig-
nificant (most of them are at the borderline of 10% significance level), the pattern
across models is very similar to that of Table 3.6.
3.7.5 Reconciling the empirical evidence on displacement
The results of the empirical analysis are conclusive of the fact that immi-
gration does not induce displacement of native population. In high immigration
areas such as London and the South of England, as well as for individuals with
lower skills, the effect on native population is, at most, close to zero. This evi-
dence clashes with the empirical findings of previous studies such as Hatton and
Tani (2005), which found significant displacement effects. In this Section, the
two different approaches are compared; the conclusion is that the use of data
with information about skills of migrants yields completely different results.
Hatton and Tani (2005) report a displacement of 30 to 35 previous residents for
every 100 new (net) immigrants; this figure increases and becomes significant (to
about 50) for the case of 6 Southern Regions. In their paper, they use regional
migration data from 1982 to 2000 extracted from NHSCR and IPS, which only
report flows by age and sex. Will analysis containing information on skill level
produce different results? To answer the question, in Table 3.12 some of the
models previously estimated have been estimated with and without information
on qualification and age. Although this analysis is only partially comparable with
Hatton and Tani (2005) and is based on a very small number of observations,
the resemblance to their findings is striking38.
The first two columns show that a regression of net migration on immigration
rate across nine regions yields a slope of −0.340 (s.e.0.146) for the 9 regions. 39.
Consistent with the findings of Hatton and Tani (2005), displacement is larger in
the Southern Regions (−0.442, s.e.0.175). The next two columns report the re-
38The immigration variable in Hatton and Tani (2005) is constituted by net immigration
(i.e., excluding emigration) and includes all UK regions.
39Due to limited degrees of freedom of the first two columns, control variables cannot be
used and they are hence excluded to keep results comparable across the different specifications.
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sults of the same regressions when flows are segmented by qualification and age.
The results are very different: there is evidence that, for every 10 immigrants,
more than 17 previous residents move in the same region/qualification/age cell.
Interestingly, this positive effect is even larger when the 6 Southern Regions are
considered. To better compare these results with those in Table 3.6, the last
two columns report the estimates for the groups with no or low qualifications,
for both natives and earlier immigrants. It can be seen that the estimates are
consistent with the general findings of the analysis, although the magnitude of
the coefficients is somewhat different and the estimates for earlier immigrants are
not significant. One potential explanation for this fact is that migrations within
regions are ignored.
Table 3.12: Impact of immigration on internal migration - regional level
No skill breakdown Qualification and age No/other, low qualif.
All regions 6 regions All regions 6 regions Natives Earlier imm.
Net-migration –0.340* –0.442 1.747*** 2.241*** 0.407** –0.798
(0.146) (0.175) (0.303) (0.426) (0.127) (0.647)
N 10 6 90 54 60 60
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ significant at 0.1%; ∗∗ significant at 1%; ∗ significant at
5%. Dependent variable is the net migration rate of respective groups. The reported coefficient
refers to the immigration rate instrumented by historical settlements of foreign-born by ethnic
group. All models are weighted by the average population of LAD; models in the last four columns
include fixed LAD qualifcation and age fixed effects. The six regions refer to the Southern Regions
defined by Hatton and Tani (2005), i.e., West Midlands, East Midlands, East of England, South
East, South West and London.
3.8 Conclusions
The impact of immigration on internal movements of natives and foreign-
born persons in England and Wales has been analysed. Immigration might
cause downward pressures on wages and employment and thus displace previ-
ous residents from their local labour market. This mechanism has been described
through a model that stratifies each local authority district into qualification and
age cells, where immigrants and natives are imperfect substitutes. The model
predicts that pressures to leave an area will be larger when the total effect of
migration - transmitted within and between skill groups - is larger. Adverse
effects of immigration are more likely to affect those groups with similar skill
distribution, such as earlier immigrants.
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Using confidential detailed 2001 Census data available only under special condi-
tions, the displacement hypothesis has been tested through an econometric model
which relates internal migration measures such as out-migration, in-migration
and net-migration to the relative immigrant flows in each LAD/qualification/age
cell. The main findings are that an increase in immigration does not lead to an
outflow of natives from the local labour market. Natives and immigrants are
instead attracted to the same areas, and this substantiates their complementar-
ity in production. This is further corroborated by evidence of displacement for
earlier immigrants, especially for individuals with no or low qualifications.
The findings of this study are similar to those that have tested the displacement
hypothesis in other countries. Comparability with the findings of USA studies
such as Card (2001) is somewhat problematic because of the different composi-
tion of immigrants. Results could be compared with the study of Stillman and
Mare´ (2007) about New Zealand, since recent immigration is mainly composed
of young educated individuals. The evidence of displacement effect for earlier
immigrants is unique to this study. Previous literature either did not find nega-
tive effect (Card, 2001; Stillman and Mare´, 2007) or did not analyse the effect on
foreign-born persons (Borjas, 2003; Hatton and Tani, 2005). The findings con-
tained in this paper are of particular interest for the case of England and Wales.
It is well known that recent and earlier immigrants move to similar areas because
they share the same social networks (Stillwell and Duke-Williams, 2005). On the
other hand, competition triggered by increased immigration and imperfect sub-
stitution leads to higher pressures on wages (Manacorda et al., 2008). Especially
for the group of low-skilled migrants, the second effect seems to prevail, forcing
them to migrate out of the labour market; the exact dynamics, however, remain
unknown and require further research.
It is important to emphasize that the findings of this study are limited to a
particular period, which corresponds to the last Census of England and Wales.
When detailed data about recent migration from Eastern Europe becomes avail-
able, further research will be needed to understand if and how the dynamics of
the labour markets have changed. A substantial change in the skill composition
of new immigrants might affect the competition pressures in the local labour
market. The total effect depends on the extent to which such change might alter
the skill composition of earlier immigrants and native population. If the economy
has sufficiently flexible labour markets, this impact is thought to be indiscernible
in the long run, but it could create inbalances in the short run.
To conclude, the substantial contribution of this Chapter has been to highlight
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the importance of analysing migration patterns using a fine definition of local
labour market and differentiating between types of workers. Using detailed data
that are appropriate to the theory under discussion is a suitable starting point
for investigating the equilibrating mechanism of local labour markets in response
to heterogeneous immigration, and futures studies should take this into account.
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Appendix
a) Derivation of equation 3.1
The F.O.C of profit maximisation for each of the Ljsak inputs are:
qj
∂Yj
∂Lj
{ ρ
ρ − 1(∑s νjsL ρρ−1js )
1
ρ−1 ρ − 1
ρ
L
1
ρ
jsνjs
⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭ ×
{ δ
δ − 1(∑a λsaL δδ−1sa )
1
δ−1 δ − 1
δ
L
1
δ
jsaλsa
⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭ ×
{ η
η − 1(∑k ψjsakL ηη−1jsak)
1
η−1 η − 1
η
L
1
η
jsakψjsak
⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭ = wjsak
Taking logarithms of both sides of the equation yields:
lnwjsak = ln(qj ∂Yj
∂Lj
)+1
ρ
lnLj+(1
δ
−1
ρ
) lnLjs+(1
η
−1
δ
) lnLjsa−1
η
lnLjsak+κ
where, κ = lnνjs + lnλsa + lnψjsak and qj is the price of the output in each LAD.
b) Derivation of effects of immigration on wages and employment
This expression is derived for equation 3.6, but the argument applies to equations
3.5 to 3.8. Consider equation 3.4:
ln
Ljsak
Pjsak
= εη
ε + η{ ln(qj ∂Yj∂Lj )+1ρ lnLj+(1δ−1ρ) lnLjs+(1η−1δ) lnLjsa+κ}− εε + η lnPjsak
Derivation w.r. to lnPjsaM yields:
d ln(LjsaNPjsaN )
d lnPjsaM
= εη
ε + η{1ρ ∂ lnLj∂ lnPjsaM + (1δ − 1ρ) ∂ lnLjs∂ lnPjsaM + (1η − 1δ) ∂ lnLjsa∂ lnPjsaM }
where
∂ lnLj
∂ lnPjsaM
= ∂ lnLj∂Ljsdcurly+
∂Ljs
∂Ljsadcurly+
∂Ljsa
∂ lnPjsaM
and
∂ lnLjs
∂ lnPjsaM
= ∂ lnLjs∂Ljsadcurly+
∂Ljsa
∂ lnPjsaM
.
The partials
∂ lnL()
∂L(⋅) and
∂ lnL()
∂ lnL(⋅) are all positive, as they are production functions
increasing in their input.
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Positivity of
∂Ljsa
∂ lnPjsaM
is found by using the labour supply:
LjsaN = wεjsaNPjsaN
LjsaM = wεjsaMPjsaM
LjsaN +LjsaM = wεjsaNPjsaN +wεjsaMPjsaM
Ljsa = wεjsaNPjsaN +wεjsaMPjsaM
∂Ljsa
∂PjsaM
= wεjsaM > 0
∂Ljsa
∂ lnPjsaM
= ∂Ljsa
∂PjsaM
PjsaM > 0
c) Estimation of population and flows without students
Models are estimated using Iterative Proportional Fitting (IPF). Students popu-
lation is the unknown object, indicated by DSACX, which is a cross-tabulation
between LAD (D), qualification (S), age (A), country of birth (C) and student
status (X). Available Census data from Table C0949 and MG105 are DSAC
and DX; interactions from SARs are SAX, CX an SC. The object of interest
can be estimated with a two-step procedure. In the first part, some interactions
are estimated using Census margins as constraint:
ln(φSAXwyz ) = φSAwy + φXz + ln(uSAXwyz ),
ln(φCXmz ) = φCm + φXz + ln(uCXmz ),
ln(φSACwym) = φSAwy + φCm + ln(uSACwym),
where φ represent parameters, for which data from Census tables provide suffi-
cient statistics. The terms u are offsets of the model and correspond to associa-
tion structures borrowed from SARs. The predicted values obtained are used as
constraints in the second step.
ln(ζDSACXkwymz ) =
C0949ucurlyleftudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymoducurlymidudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymoducurlyright
φDSAXkwym +MG105ucurlyφDXkm +
Step 1ucurlyleftudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymoducurlymidudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymoducurlyright
ln(φˆSAXwyz ) + ln(φˆCXmz ) + ln(φˆSACwym)
This procedure is similar to that developed in Raymer et al. (2008). The precision
of the algorithm can be assessed by comparing the estimates with the counts
from SARs; this comparison is however possible only at regional level. The
following graph reports the estimates for DSACX for the non-student foreign-
born population in London.
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Figure 3.4: Comparison of IPF estimates and SARs
Source: own computations and SARs.
NQ=No, other or unknown qualifications;LQ=Low qualifications;HQ=High qualifications
Figure 3.5: Local authority districts in England and Wales (inset: London)
Digitalised boundaries from UKBorders (http://borders.edina.ac.uk/)
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Chapter 4
Network or Segregation?
Analysing Employment
Outcomes of Ethnic Groups
4.1 Introduction
In many developed countries, the economic success of immigrants and ethnic
minorities is an issue of great importance due to their growing participation in
the labour force. Although it is well known that the majority of these groups are
clustered in ethnic enclaves within metropolitan and urban areas, it is an open
question how this spatial concentration affects their labour market outcomes.
Edin et al. (2003) discuss possible mechanisms through which ethnic concentra-
tion affect outcomes. Most of these mechanisms make contrasting predictions in
terms of labour market performance of the enclave’s members. On the one hand
is a positive role of the enclave, which constitutes a social network of friends,
relatives and members of the community, and provides information about jobs
and employee referrals (Rees, 1966). On the other hand, spatial concentration
of certain groups is also associated with negative aspects, such as reduced inter-
action with natives and other ethnic groups, slower acquisition of language skills
and self-segregation in deprived areas (Cutler and Glaeser, 1997).
These ambiguous aspects have been extensively explored by economists, who
have developed models and methodologies to study the casual effect of living
in an enclave on wages and employment (Cutler and Glaeser, 1997; Edin et al.,
2003; Wahba and Zenou, 2005). The present Chapter contributes to this litera-
ture in several ways. First, the impact on labour market outcomes is analysed
separately for foreign- and native-born ethnic groups in England and Wales. This
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distinction has been so far disregarded in the literature, which focuses either on
the outcomes of all immigrants or on those of ethnic minorities in general. This
ignores the expectation that the impact of living in an enclave will be different
depending on the country of birth of individuals. Due to differences in terms of
human capital, language ability, cultural assimilation and residential patterns,
the intensity with which immigrants and natives interact with other members of
the enclave is likely to be very different. For example, because of their language
gap or due to the difficulty of assimilating in the country, one would expect
foreign-born individuals to heavily rely on friends and relative, especially of their
own ethnicity, when looking for a job. On the other hand, native persons would
find it more convenient and productive to use formal job search methods, such as
job centres and employment agencies. Attitudes of employers towards immigrant
job-seekers are also likely to be different. Abstracting from any issue related to
discrimination, employers would find it quite difficult to obtain complete infor-
mation about the skills of individuals who received their education and training
abroad. More generally, the imperfect transferability of qualifications into the
host country and the difficulties related to cultural assimilation translate into
higher costs of looking for a job using formal channels, inducing immigrants to
rely on social networks. Natives, on the other hand, will experience less diffi-
culties in searching for jobs. Since they have been educated in the country and
exposed to its language and culture, costs of using formal job search methods
are expected to be substantially lower. However, there could be differences even
across natives, depending on which ethnic group they belong, as this is strictly
related with their level of social and economic integration and their religious
background. Similarly, differences in the job search methods could be very pro-
nounced between males and females, depending on their ethnicity. This is indeed
the case of Britain, where the major ethnic groups differ profoundly in terms of
their economic development, cultural assimilation, religious practices and atti-
tudes towards women.
The second contribution of this research is the use of a local measure of exposure,
capable of capturing the degree of interaction among members of the same group
at a detailed geographic level. Previous work that has studied the relationship
between ethnic enclaves and outcomes has used measures such as density (Clark
and Drinkwater, 2002) or concentration (Patacchini and Zenou, 2008) at Local
Authority District (LAD) level, with no detail of the distribution of ethnic groups
at a more disaggregated level. The index developed in the present Chapter has
the feature of being constructed using detailed Census ward level data, which
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are then aggregated to obtain a measure to LAD level. This approach has the
advantage of capturing the intensity of interactions within each ethnic group and
at the same time bypasses issues related with the sorting across wards, i.e., with
the fact that individual do not randomly locate within a LAD.
The third aspect of this research is to address some methodological problems
related to the causal nature of the relationship between living in an enclave and
labour market outcomes. Depending on the extent with which unobserved fac-
tors (such as ability) lead to sorting of individuals into areas where employment
is higher, standard OLS techniques will lead to biased estimates. This issue is
addressed in several ways: first, unobserved area-specific characteristics are con-
trolled by using data data from two Censuses. Second, an instrumental variable
approach is used to address the potential endogeneity originating from the corre-
lation between employment and ethnic/area-specific unobserved characteristics.
Third, a series of robustness checks are performed in order to test the sensitivity
of the results to the spatial dependence across LADs.
The results of the analysis show that the impact of living in an enclave differs
substantially across groups. For the majority of immigrants there is evidence
of a positive effect on employment, with magnitudes that vary from 0.3% to
1% for every percentage increase in the index that is developed to measure the
networks. There is evidence of a positive effect also for native-born individuals,
but in general the magnitude is quite low. Pakistanis & Bangladeshi appear to
be the only group for which living in an enclave is detrimental for employment,
although results are not particularly robust.
The Chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 surveys the relevant literature;
in Section 4.3 the mechanism through which costs and benefits of living in an
enclave affect the probability of finding a job is outlined, followed by a descrip-
tion of the econometric specification in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 describes the
data and presents summary statistics. The analysis is divided in two parts: in
Section 4.6, the impact on labour market outcomes is studied using OLS and IV
techniques; in Section 4.7, several robustness checks are performed. Section 4.8
concludes the Chapter.
4.2 Enclaves and outcomes in the literature
There are numerous studies that explore the role of enclaves in developed
countries. The intention of the empirical literature is to find what the con-
sequences are, in terms of wages and outcomes, for persons belonging to the
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enclave or, more generally, for individuals who live in areas with high concentra-
tion of a given ethnic group. The findings are in general mixed.
Cutler and Glaeser (1997) study the impact of racial segregation on labour market
outcomes of the Black population across USA cities. They developed a model
in which outcomes at metropolitan statistical area (MSA) level are correlated
with a measure of segregation that is derived using detailed data from Census
tracts. After addressing causality through a set of instrumental variables, they
found substantial negative effects of segregation on education, income and sin-
gle mother status. Using 1980 and 1990 Census data, Borjas (2000) looks at
immigrants’ wage growth across MSAs. In the most detailed specification, he
finds that living in enclaves where segregation increases by 10%, reduces wage
growth by up to 4%. Chowdhury and Pedace (2007) explore the impact of eth-
nic concentration on wages of immigrants in California, drawing a 5% sample
from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series. They found that any positive
effect obtained from OLS estimates is offset when using instrumental variables
and fixed effects for each MSA, although positive spillovers across ethnic groups
persist. The impact of ethnic enclaves in the context of the Canadian labour
market is analysed by Warman (2007). Adopting an approach similar to Borjas
(2000), he finds that wage growth of immigrants to Canada is negatively affected
by segregation, with an impact somewhat larger than the USA case.
Several studies have been carried out in European countries. Edin et al. (2003)
exploit a Swedish dispersal policy for refugees which allows to address the issue
of endogeneity. The negative impact implied by the OLS estimation turns into
positive when the instrumental variable approach is adopted. This consists of
using a measure for ethnic concentration that refers to the municipality at the
time when refugees were randomly assigned there. A similar approach is used to
control for ability sorting by Damm (2009) using data about a refugee dispersal
policy implemented in Denmark. By instrumenting current segregation using
flows rather than stocks, she finds that a change in the standard deviation in the
size of ethnic population is associated with an increase in earnings of about 18%.
Few studies have been carried out in the UK. This is somewhat surprising, given
the raising concern about the integration of ethnic minorities in this country
(see, for example, Manning and Roy, 2007; Georgiadis and Manning, 2009). Us-
ing data for England and Wales drawn from the 1991 Census and from the
Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities, Clark and Drinkwater (2002) found
that employment (unemployment) probabilities are lower (higher) in wards with
greater ethnic clustering. However, since endogeneity issues and sorting have not
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been addressed, these results are only indicative of a correlation, rather than of
a true causal relationship. Using the theoretical framework originally proposed
by Calvo´-Armengol and Jackson (2004), Patacchini and Zenou (2008) estimate a
specification in which employment probabilities in a given area are modelled as a
function of the ethnic concentration in the same and in the neighboring areas. In
their analyses, they use a panel of data at LAD level constructed from the labour
force survey (LFS); issues of sorting across LADs and endogeneity are addressed
in their paper by using instrumental variables and including fixed LAD effects.
Their main findings show that for all ethnic groups except Whites, employment
is higher in LADs where the concentration of individuals of the same group is
larger, as well as in neighboring LADs, within 90 minutes driving time.
4.3 Costs and benefits of enclaves
The purpose of this Section is to sketch the economic intuition that captures
the costs and benefits of living in an enclave in terms of employment outcomes.
Suppose that the probability of finding a job depends on the effort that each
individual puts in using formal (φ) and informal (χ) job search methods:
y = f(φ,χ) (4.1)
Informal methods include, for example, referrals from employees, while formal
methods consists of job centres and employment agencies. A plausible assump-
tion is that formal methods are more productive than informal methods:
df
dφ
> df
dχ
> 0 (4.2)
Informal methods depend positively on the number of personal contactsN through
the function χ = χ(N), with dχdN > 0. Without loss of generality, it is possible
to assume that the cost of having personal contacts are very small or zero for
all groups. On the other hand, formal job methods have a cost that is inversely
proportional to the country-specific human capital, such as language.
Formal methods also depend on the number of contacts, i.e., φ = φ(N); in this
case, however, dφdN < 0, i.e., a larger network is detrimental to this method of look-
ing for jobs. The rationale is that formal and informal methods are substitutes:
by spending time in using friends and relatives to look for a job, individuals will
have less resources to invest in formal methods.
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Hence, the general prediction of the model is that living in an enclave produces
two counteracting effects in terms of employment: one positive, which stems from
the social interaction within the ethnic network; the other negative, which is a
consequence of greater segregation and lower interaction with the local culture.
The sign and magnitude of this effect are ambiguous, and will be positive if:
∂f
∂χ
∂χ
∂N
> ∂f
∂φ
∂φ
∂N
, (4.3)
i.e., when the increase in the probability of finding a job through informal chan-
nels more than compensates the reduction due to a less intensive use of formal
methods. The net effect will depend on factors such as country of birth, ethnicity
and gender, and hence is expected to vary greatly across groups.
For example, since immigrants are endowed with a relatively low level of country-
specific skills, one would expect them to extensively rely on friends and relatives
as a job search method. A larger number of contacts N will hence generate a
higher probability of employment. However, the negative effect could be large
too. The reason is that an intensive use of informal networks will reduce the
exposure of immigrants to the local culture and language, and hence to the use
of formal methods. This, in turn, will decrease the likelihood of finding a job.
Natives, on the other hand, are expected to rely less on friends and relatives,
since formal channels are more productive and less costly compared to immi-
grants. However, even within this group, there could be differences across ethnic
groups or gender because of, say, the different level of cultural assimilation.
In order to test how the impact of the enclave on the employment probabilities
varies across groups, an econometric framework is outlined in Section 4.4.
4.4 Econometric implementation
4.4.1 Measuring enclaves
To test the predictions outlined in the previous Section, it is necessary to
employ a measure that captures the intensity with which individuals of a given
ethnic group interact. Several indices have been used by economists, most of
which build upon measures used by the sociology literature (for a survey, see
Massey and Denton, 1988). For example, Cutler and Glaeser (1997) construct
an index of segregation for Black people at MSA level using data on Census
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tracts within each area40. Borjas (2000) uses indices of exposure and of relative
clustering that are based on the concentrations of individuals of a given country
of birth in an area41.
In order to measure how individuals interact at local level, an index based on
information of ethnic groups at ward level (a finer geography than LAD) is con-
structed42. This measure, sometimes named index of isolation, is defined as:
P ⋆jk =∑
i
Mijk
Mjk
Mijk
Mij
, (4.4)
where M indicates the number of persons, i indicates the ward within each LAD
j, and k represents the ethnic group.
The index P ⋆jk has at least two advantages with respect to measures previously
used in the literature. First, it captures the strength with which members of
each ethnic group are exposed to each other (Massey and Denton, 1988). A
measure of concentration at LAD level such as the one used by Patacchini and
Zenou (2008), for example, would not be able to distinguish the intensity of in-
teractions, as these are likely to happen at a very local level (Topa, 2001). The
second advantage is that since the index is aggregated at LAD level, problems of
sorting across wards are attenuated, as pointed out by Cutler and Glaeser (1997).
This procedure, however, may generate problems related with the sorting across
LADs and this is discussed in the next Subsection.
4.4.2 Sorting and causality
The issue of sorting originates from the fact that unobservable characteristics
which attract individuals to certain areas can be correlated with the outcome
variable, such as employment. Failing to control for such factors will generate an
omitted variable bias, the sign and magnitude of which are unknown a priori.
This issue is usually addressed by using fixed effects regression models, which
include area specific indicators to eliminate the persistence of unobserved char-
acteristics. As detailed in the next Section, the strategy adopted in the analysis
is to construct first differences using data from two Censuses. With two periods,
this procedure is identical to the least square dummy variable estimation.
It is however insightful to illustrate the importance of addressing the problem of
40This is defined as: P sjk = 12 ∑i ∣MijkMjk − Mijk¯Mjk¯ ∣, where M indicates the number of persons, i
and j indicates sub-areas and areas, respectively, and k¯ is an ethnic group different from k.
41The first is defined as: P ejk = Mjk∑kMjk ; the second measure is defined as P rjk = Mjk∑kMjk / Mk∑jkMjk .
42See Appendix for a map of ward LADs of pertinence in England and Wales.
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sorting with an example from the data that will be used in the analysis. A series
of regression models of employment rate on the index P ⋆ have been estimated
separately for the 1991 and 2001 Censuses for all the groups of interest. Results
of these regressions are reported in the Appendix (Tables 4.6 to 4.13). Interest-
ingly, the cross-sectional analysis reveals the presence of a negative relationship
between employment and P ⋆ in most of the specifications and for both years.
This example is useful to interpret the results of some studies such as Clark and
Drinkwater (2002), who found a negative relationship between employment out-
comes and living in an enclave. Although their specifications include a rich set
of covariates, their models could still suffer of omitted variable bias. As it will
be shown in the analysis in Section 4.6, most of the negative patterns found with
single cross-sections will be reverted when fixed effects are used.
4.4.3 Econometric specification
The simple model sketched in the previous Section is estimated using the
following econometric specification for each ethnic group k:
∆ej = α + γ∆P ⋆j +∆Xjβ +∆εj, (4.5)
where ej measures the employment population ratio in each LAD j, P ⋆j is the
index defined in Section 4.3; Xj includes a set of LAD/ethnic specific covariates
such as the percentage of individual with a university degree, the unemployment
rate and the share of home owners; ε is a random component. The parameter
of interest is γ, which measures the percentage change in employment due to a
percentage change in P ⋆.
The equation is estimated using first differences. A constant is included in the
model, in order to capture time effects. In the large majority of the specifica-
tions, the coefficient for the constant term is highly significant; given the fact
that differences are calculated using a ten year window, the constant should cap-
ture trends in the employment rate.
Separate estimations are carried out for UK-born and immigrants, and for males
and females. While all control variables vary by gender and country of birth, P ⋆
is fixed across these groups and varies only by ethnicity. The rationale is that,
since ties are particularly strong within ethnic groups, one would expect natives
and immigrants (irrespective of gender) to share the same network.
Even though specification in equation 4.5 controls for the presence of unobserved
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LAD effects correlated with both employment and P ⋆, there could be unobserved
characteristics in each ethnic group (such as ability or religious background) that
could lead individuals to move in an enclave. If these unobserved factors are pos-
itively correlated with employment, OLS estimates of γ will be upwardly biased.
The literature proposes several solutions to this problem. For example, Edin
et al. (2003) and Damm (2009) exploit the random sorting originated from a dis-
persal policy for refugees. In this case, individuals do not choose their residential
location (in the first instance) and the analysis of outcomes for those that do
not change residence will inform about the causal impact of living in an enclave.
When data about such a natural experiment are not available, an alternative
solution is to find an instrument which has the feature of being a predictor of
the endogenous variable (the measure of network) and being uncorrelated with
the outcome variable. Several instruments have been proposed by the literature,
mainly in the context of immigration studies; for example, Card (2001) uses his-
torical settlement of immigrants by country of birth, while Ottaviano and Peri
(2006b) use distance from the nearest port of entry.
A similar strategy is followed in the present Chapter and two instruments for
P ⋆ are used: the change in the share of immigrant population between 1980
and 1990 by country of birth and the distance from the nearest port of en-
try. For example, the change in the share of foreign-born population from the
Caribbean and Africa between 1980 and 1990 is used to instrument P ⋆ for the
group of Blacks. Similarly, information about immigration growth from India
(Pakistan and Bangladesh) is used to instrument the index for Indians (Pak-
istanis & Bangladeshi). In addition, a second instrument, represented by the
distance from the closest gateways, is proposed. The port of entries consist of
the main airports in England and Wales along with seaports that have played an
important role in immigration.43.
Another potential source of endogeneity is related with spatial dependence. For
example, employment rates could be correlated across contiguous LADs; like-
wise, the size of enclaves is expected to be similar to that of neighboring areas.
Depending on which variables are spatially correlated across LADs and on the
magnitude of this dependence, estimates of γ will be biased or inefficient. For
this reason, a series of robustness checks that indirectly address the problem of
spatial dependence will be presented after the IV estimation.
43These are: Heathrow, Manchester, Gatwick, Luton, Stansted, Birmingham, Dover, Liv-
erpool, Newham, Southampton, Felixstowe and North East Lincolnshire. The instrument
corresponds to the Euclidean distance between the centroids of the LADs where the ports are
located.
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Data used in the analysis come from several sources. To construct the in-
dex P ⋆, data on ethnicity at ward level are needed over time. This is usually
quite problematic given the frequent boundary changes in England and Wales.
Luckily, a project at the Cathie Marsh Centre for Census and Survey Research
(CCSR) has been carried out to obtain reliable estimates of ethnic population
over time. This was done by converting 1991 Census data to the ward geography
as of 200144. This has allowed to compare the data from 1991 with those from
2001 downloaded from Nomisweb45.
The employment rate, the percentage of university degrees, the share of home
owners and occupational categories are obtained from the Samples of Anonymised
Records (SARs) for 1991 and from the Small Area Microdata (SAM) for 2001.
These are Census microdata (2% and 5% sample, respectively) that have the
advantage of recording the LAD of residence of individuals, a detail that is usu-
ally missing in survey data due to confidentiality reasons46. Due to a change in
the coding of many variables, however, a perfect comparison between 1991 and
2001 is not possible. For this reason, only those variables less prone to mea-
surement error have been selected. For example, the employment rate has been
constructed by excluding all students (even part time workers), since Census
1991 records students at their home address, while Census 2001 at their term
time address. Similarly, since the categories about highest level of qualification
are not comparable between the two years, the possession of a university degree -
a threshold common in both definitions - has been used to construct an indicator
for education. Finally, due to the change in the classification of occupations,
and indicator for the two top-wage groups has been constructed, as these can be
matched over time with little error47.
Due to the small size of some cell, only major ethnic groups have been consid-
ered: these are Blacks, Indians, Pakistanis & Bangladeshi and Whites48.
Finally, only those LADs with a suitable number of observations and that were
comparable between 1991 and 2001 were selected49. The final sample is such
44The details of the project are on http://www.ccsr.ac.uk/popla/TimeSeriesOutput.shtml
45https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/
46An exception is the Special Licence Labour Force Survey, which has data at LAD level.
However, since this is available from 2003 only, analyses at local level are still constrained by
the small amount of observations, especially when data on ethnicity are needed.
47According to ONS, more than 80% of the sub-occupations within these two groups are
defined in the same way in 1991 and 2001. Source: OOSS user guide 2000, 22
48The group of Blacks consist of Black Caribbeans and Black Africans.
49Some LAD boundaries changed in 1998.
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that it comprises 91.6% of total Black population aged 16 to 64; the same figure
is 84.7% for Indians, 85.2% for Pakistanis & Bangladeshi and 74.9% for Whites.
The selected areas are represented in Figure 4.1 for each ethnic group. As can be
seen, ethnic minorities are focused in few LADs, mainly in the London Boroughs,
the Metropolitan Districts and other Unitary Authorities (such as Bristol, Cam-
bridge and Cardiff), while White population is more diffused across the districts.
Blacks Indians
Pakistanis and Bangladeshi Whites
Figure 4.1: Selected LADs for each ethnic group
Blue: Metropolitan Districts and London Boroughs; Green: other LADs
Source: 1991 SARs and 2001 SAM. Digitalised boundaries from UKBorders (http://borders.edina.ac.uk/)
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Table 4.1 reports summary statistics for selected variables; the figures refer only
to the observations used in the analysis. Employment varies substantially across
groups, with the lowest rates found among Pakistanis & Bangladeshi and the
highest among Whites. Between 1991 and 2001, there has been an increase in
employment rates, especially among ethnic minorities. Interestingly, for Blacks
and Indians, rates in 1991 were higher among immigrants than among natives,
while the opposite was observed in 2001. The index P ⋆ varies slightly across
the three ethnic minority groups. During the period under analysis, it increased,
particularly for the group of Pakistanis & Bangladeshi. For Whites, on the other
hand, there was a decrease of about 1%50.
Interesting aspects emerge also from the inspection of the skill levels of individ-
uals. As for education, an important result from the previous Chapter was that
immigrants in 2001 were more educated than natives. Data in the table confirm
this result even when groups are broken down by ethnicity. The only exception is
the group of Pakistanis & Bangladeshi, especially males, for which the figure for
UK-born is much larger than for immigrants. Between 1991 and 2001, there was
a substantial increase in the percentage of individuals holding a degree, except
for Whites, for which the increase was negligible.
When considering the percentage of individuals in the top two occupations, the
largest percentage for Blacks and Indians is seen among immigrants; however,
the increase over time was larger for natives. Another interesting aspect is that
among the Whites this percentage is much higher for the UK-born despite their
lower educational attainment; this could signal an imperfect transferability of
educational qualifications for White immigrants.
Perhaps due to underreporting, figures of unemployment are higher for males
than for females (except for the group of Pakistanis & Bangladeshi)51. Unem-
ployment decreased substantially for all groups between 1991 and 2001.
Some ethnic groups such as Indians have a higher likelihood of owning a house
than any other group, even than UK-born Whites. On the other hand, Blacks
are among those with the lowest rate of home ownership.
Summary data reveals that there are many differences across the groups consid-
ered; the regression analyses in the next Sections will control for these.
50Although P ⋆ has the same value for males and females, as well as for UK- and foreign-born,
the tables reveal small differences. This is due to the different number of LADs used in the
analysis for these groups.
51According to a recent ONS report (http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=462)
the only case of female unemployment larger than for males was the group of Pakistanis; this
seems to corroborate the statistics in the table.
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics
1991 2001
Males Females Males Females
UK-born F-born UK-born F-born UK-born F-born UK-born F-born
Blacks
empl. rate 0.58 0.66 0.56 0.65 0.68 0.63 0.66 0.55
P ⋆ 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.06
higher degree 0.07 0.19 0.13 0.24 0.24 0.34 0.31 0.33
top 2 occup. 0.16 0.24 0.22 0.36 0.31 0.29 0.33 0.26
unempl. rate 0.31 0.19 0.16 0.08 0.15 0.14 0.09 0.10
% home owner 0.55 0.56 0.48 0.58 0.54 0.47 0.48 0.47
N 85 101 74 95 85 101 74 95
Indians
empl. rate 0.48 0.78 0.44 0.57 0.62 0.79 0.60 0.59
P ⋆ 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.09 0.06
higher degree 0.14 0.30 0.10 0.18 0.33 0.47 0.35 0.37
top 2 occup. 0.18 0.42 0.15 0.21 0.33 0.45 0.29 0.28
unempl. rate 0.25 0.11 0.15 0.10 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.06
% home owner 0.77 0.80 0.83 0.80 0.75 0.73 0.76 0.76
N 76 137 70 125 76 137 70 125
Pakistanis and Bangladeshi
empl. rate 0.57 0.31 0.34 0.58 0.59 0.37 0.50 0.67
P ⋆ 0.05 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.12 0.11 0.08
higher degree 0.18 0.05 0.09 0.13 0.37 0.19 0.24 0.24
top 2 occup. 0.10 0.07 0.23 0.07 0.20 0.15 0.21 0.09
unempl. rate 0.10 0.33 0.38 0.26 0.06 0.16 0.20 0.12
% home owner 0.80 0.77 0.72 0.70 0.76 0.67 0.69 0.62
N 72 59 109 90 72 59 109 90
Whites
empl. rate 0.77 0.72 0.62 0.58 0.78 0.75 0.66 0.62
P ⋆ 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.93 0.95 0.94
higher degree 0.17 0.20 0.13 0.21 0.20 0.37 0.20 0.37
top 2 occup. 0.32 0.23 0.36 0.29 0.35 0.28 0.43 0.33
unempl. rate 0.11 0.12 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.05
% home owner 0.73 0.63 0.73 0.67 0.74 0.59 0.73 0.62
N 234 178 234 188 234 178 234 188
Own computations from SARs, SAM, and Census data. Figures are weighted by the number of in-
dividuals in each LAD. Employment refers to the employment population rate, unemployment to the
unemployment rate, higher degree to the percentage of individuals holding at least an university degree, home
ownership to the share of individuals owning a house.
4.6 Analysis
Table 4.2 reports the estimates of equation 4.5. For each ethnic group, the
left-hand panel presents the estimates without control variables, while the speci-
fications in the right-hand panel contain the share of individuals with a university
degree, the unemployment rate and the percentage of home owners, all expressed
as differences. The Appendix reports full estimates of the models with control
variables. All models have been estimated separately for males and females and
for UK- and foreign-born individuals.
In the case of UK-born Blacks, the coefficient of P ⋆ has opposite sign for males
and females, but its magnitude is relatively low and is not statistically significant,
even after adding control variables that substantially improve the general fit of
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the model. On the other hand, for Black immigrants, the estimated coefficient
is significantly positive for both males and females. Even after controlling for
ethnic-group/area specific characteristics, estimates are economically and statis-
tically significant. For Black males, a 1% increase in P ⋆ determines an increase
of 0.8% in employment, while for females, this impact is just below 0.6%.
Table 4.2: OLS estimates of ethnic networks effects on employment
Without controls With controls
Males Females Males Females
UK-born F-born UK-born F-born UK-born F-Born UK-born F-Born
Blacks
P ⋆ –0.179 0.953** 0.190 1.013*** –0.261 0.817*** –0.006 0.591**
(0.439) (0.423) (0.445) (0.328) (0.254) (0.279) (0.427) (0.289)
R2 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.09 0.68 0.63 0.25 0.37
N 85 101 74 95 85 101 74 95
Indians
P ⋆ 0.253 0.681*** –0.146 0.270 0.388 0.386** 0.082 0.311
(0.543) (0.223) (0.567) (0.281) (0.400) (0.167) (0.525) (0.248)
R2 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.50 0.50 0.22 0.26
N 76 137 70 125 76 137 70 125
Pakistanis and Bangladeshi
P ⋆ –0.569 –0.143 –0.996* –0.191 –0.666** –0.359** –0.196 0.091
(0.442) (0.237) (0.506) (0.200) (0.289) (0.174) (0.426) (0.162)
R2 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.62 0.52 0.48 0.44
N 72 109 59 90 72 109 59 90
Whites
P ⋆ 0.037 0.472** 0.088 0.710*** 0.140* 0.554*** 0.176** 0.787***
(0.086) (0.199) (0.076) (0.190) (0.079) (0.163) (0.073) (0.173)
R2 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.07 0.32 0.45 0.21 0.32
N 233 178 233 188 233 178 233 188
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ significant at 1%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗ significant at 10%. The
reported coefficient refers to the network measure P ⋆. The control variables used are the unemployment rate,
the share of individuals with higher degree and the percentage of house owners. Models are weighted by the
population of each ethnic group in the LAD.
The estimated coefficients for Indians are all similar, except for UK-born females;
however, the standard errors are quite large and the null hypothesis of no effect
is rejected only for the group of male immigrants. Similarly to the case of Blacks,
the introduction of control variables attenuates the estimate of the coefficient,
but the pattern is unchanged.
In contrast to the two ethnic groups mentioned above, for Pakistanis & Bangladeshi
the impact of living in an enclave appears to be detrimental for their employ-
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ment, especially for males, with an effect that is substantially larger (in absolute
value) for UK-born than for immigrants.
Finally, for all groups of Whites the effect of living in an area where they are
more likely to interact with other Whites is positive. The impact is however
much larger for the foreign-born.
The conclusion from the OLS estimation is that, with the exception of Pakista-
nis & Bangladeshi, the impact of living in an enclave yields positive outcomes
in terms of employment, with a magnitude that varies across groups but that in
most of the cases is larger for the foreign-born than for natives.
As discussed earlier, the use of first differences eliminates the presence of fixed
effects and helps addressing the problem of sorting across LADs. However, there
could still be unobserved factors correlated with both employment and P ⋆ and
this will lead to inconsistent estimates of the parameter of interest. For this rea-
son, the models shown in Table 4.2 have been estimated using the instrumental
variable approach described in Section 4.5. Table 4.3 reports the IV estimates
using only the past change of immigration flows and adding the distance from the
nearest port of entry as second instruments. All models are estimated controlling
for the variables used in the right-hand panel of Table 4.2. The Wald test for the
weak identification of the instruments is included in both panels; in the case of
two instruments, it is possible to test for overidentifying restrictions and hence
the values for the Sargan test are also reported.
The pattern that emerged from OLS estimation is in general confirmed, although
some of the estimates are sensitive to the use of instruments. In the case of Black
immigrants, the IV estimate is slightly smaller than the OLS for males, while
it is about twice as large for females. For Indians, the estimated coefficient is
larger for all groups, but is statistically significant only for immigrants. Esti-
mates for Pakistanis & Bangladeshi are particularly sensitive to the use of IV, as
demonstrated by the substantial increase (in absolute value) of all coefficients.
However, an inspection of the Wald statistic reveals that most of the models for
this group are close to non-rejection of the null hypothesis that the instruments
are relevant. One potential explanation for this is that Pakistanis & Bangladeshi
are one of the most recent ethnic group to migrate to Britain, with a peak in
the arrival time of immigrants between the 1970s and 1980s. As a consequence,
there could be insufficient variation in the instrumental variable (which is mea-
sured by the change in the immigrant shares between 1980 and 1990), especially
if the initial settlement of this group was focused in few LADs. Estimates for
the group of Whites are very similar to the OLS case, although the coefficient is
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slightly smaller. The only exception is constituted by UK-born males, for which
the estimate is essentially zero. However, this is also the only group for which
the Sargan test rejects the joint null hypothesis (at the 5% significance level)
that the instruments are exogenous.
Table 4.3: IV estimates of ethnic networks effects on employment
One instrument Two instruments
Males Females Males Females
UK-born F-born UK-born F-born UK-born F-Born UK-born F-Born
Blacks
P ⋆ –0.185 0.559 –0.436 1.247*** –0.219 0.713* –0.351 1.130***
(0.320) (0.394) (0.578) (0.434) (0.316) (0.379) (0.562) (0.418)
Wald 117.76 88.31 73.45 71.70 61.66 50.27 40.31 39.56
Sargan 0.48 2.25 0.44 1.27
N 85 101 74 95 85 101 74 95
Indians
P ⋆ 0.715 0.441** 0.505 0.517* 0.715 0.439** 0.507 0.522*
(0.488) (0.192) (0.646) (0.285) (0.488) (0.192) (0.646) (0.285)
Wald 121.36 360.56 106.06 320.05 59.84 179.85 52.30 158.95
Sargan 0.01 0.12 0.02 0.54
N 76 137 70 125 76 137 70 125
Pakistanis and Bangladeshi
P ⋆ –1.401 –1.352** 1.172 0.481 –1.270* –1.179** 1.233 0.240
(0.910) (0.566) (2.654) (0.477) (0.699) (0.458) (1.551) (0.373)
Wald 7.67 14.01 1.56 11.27 6.71 10.36 2.42 9.26
Sargan 0.05 0.35 0.00 0.77
N 72 109 59 90 72 109 59 90
Whites
P ⋆ 0.011 0.343* 0.151* 0.605*** –0.017 0.349* 0.141 0.677***
(0.096) (0.195) (0.087) (0.206) (0.095) (0.186) (0.087) (0.203)
Wald 451.28 382.26 503.93 401.67 237.91 207.81 263.13 219.69
Sargan 4.68 0.78 0.87 4.38
N 233 178 233 188 233 178 233 188
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ significant at 1%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗ significant at 10%. The
reported coefficient refers to the network measure P ⋆ as instrumented by the change in the country-specific
population stocks between 1980 and 1990 and the distance from the closest port of entry. Models are weighted
by the population of each ethnic group in the LAD. The Wald statistic refers to the test for weak identification
of the instruments. The Sargan statistic refers to the test for overidentifying restrictions.
The instrumental variable analysis confirms that the effect of living in an enclave
is positive for immigrants, while for the UK-born, the impact is in most cases
statistically insignificant. The exceptions for the group of male Pakistanis &
Bangladeshi are also confirmed, although the instrumental variable approach is
not robust and hence the estimates obtained could be biased.
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4.7 Robustness checks
In this Section, potential issues that could affect the results presented are
addressed. All these problems are to some extent related to spatial dependence.
The first issue is commuting. According to Census data, an increasing percent-
age of employed individuals work in a local authority that is different from the
one where he or she resides52. A person living in a given LAD but working in a
neighboring LAD is likely to be part of multiple networks: one in the workplace
and one in the place of residence. However, data will only record his or her
pertinence to the network in the LAD of residence. More in general, commuting
to a contiguous LAD generates spatial dependence in the index P ⋆. One way
to control for this is to estimate a spatial autoregressive model (see, for exam-
ple, Topa, 2001); alternatively, it is possible to include information about the
network size of neighboring LADs (Patacchini and Zenou, 2008). The approach
adopted in this Chapter is to re-estimate the models by excluding commuters.
Since information about the LAD of workplace is not available, distance to work
is used to separate individuals that work within the LAD. Two cutoff points in
terms of distance are available from the microdata and have been considered:
below 5 Km and below 20 Km. Results are very similar and will be presented for
the case of the 20 Km threshold, as this is a more conservative way to include a
larger number of commuting areas around the LAD of residence.
The second issue is related to the spatial dependence of the response variable.
The fact that areas with high employment or unemployment are clustered to-
gether is a well known and documented phenomenon (Topa, 2001). This is
particularly true when the areas considered are relatively small. The correla-
tion across observational units (i.e., employment in each LAD/ethnic cell) could
create bias of the estimates. Again, one solution could be to use spatial au-
toregressive models. In this Chapter, an alternative method is proposed, which
consists of using a variable to control for contiguity. In particular, since the
majority of LADs with contiguous borders that are in the sample consist of the
London boroughs and the Metropolitan Districts, an indicator for these areas is
created and added to the estimation. The coefficient for this variable will in-
dicate if there are differences in employment between LADs that are clustered
together and LADs that are more isolated; more importantly, the estimate of the
coefficient for P ⋆ will show if the effect on employment of living in an enclave is
different between these types or areas.
52Data from SARs and SAM show that the fraction travelling to a workplace for more than
20km was 12% in 1991 and 14% in 2001.
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A third potential source of spatial dependence is internal migration. Some indi-
viduals will decide to change residence because of employment reasons; in other
cases, however, people could move to neighboring LADs because of, say, lower
house prices, and continue working in the LAD of previous residence. Similarly
to the case of commuting, this will create spatial dependence in the measure of
P ⋆ across LADs. To address this problem, and similarly to the methodology used
in the case of commuting, the models in Table 4.4 have been estimated excluding
individuals who changed LAD in the previous year. Since information on the
LAD of origin is not available, distance of move is used to separate stayers from
migrants, with a cutoff of 20 Km53.
Table 4.4 reports the results of estimations that address the issues mentioned
above. The first panel contains the estimates of the equation 4.5 when the sam-
ple is restricted to individuals that are employed within the LAD. The second
panel includes an indicator for the LADs that belong to the London Boroughs or
to the Metropolitan Districts. Finally, the third panel excludes individuals who
changed LAD of residence in the previous year.
Although these robustness checks only indirectly address the issues related with
spatial dependence, it seems that estimates are not particularly affected by this
issue. For example, in the case of Blacks, the coefficients in the first and third
panel are very similar to those in Table 4.3. When controlling for contiguous
areas, the change in the estimates is slightly larger for the groups of immigrants
and is indicative of the fact that in more isolated LADs the impact of the enclave
is 0.16 smaller for males and 0.20 larger for females. Similarly, for the group of In-
dians, the estimated coefficients are not dissimilar to those of Table 4.3. Perhaps
the most interesting difference is for UK-born males, as the coefficient is largest
within the group, although statistically significant only in one case. For Pak-
istanis & Bangladeshi, estimates are not particularly sensitive to the different
specifications and the results confirm the negative impact for males, although
it is important to recall the issues related to the weakness of the instruments
discussed earlier. Finally, robustness checks for the groups of White immigrants
confirm that there are positive effects of living in an enclave, although coefficients
are very close to those estimated in Table 4.3 only for the model that excludes
internal migrants, while in the other two cases the estimates are somewhat lower.
53In this case, the cutoff chosen is 20 Km since information from the microdata (available
only for 2001) shows that the majority of persons who changed LAD move from a place that
is more than 20 Km away.
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4.8 Discussion and final remarks
The results from the OLS and IV analysis, as well as the robustness checks,
indicate that the more intense is the use of informal job search methods, the
higher will be the likelihood of being employed. This result is particulary strong
for Black and Indian immigrants: one potential explanation for this is that the
network of these two groups is well-established, since the groups of Blacks (es-
pecially Black Caribbeans) and Indians have a long history of migration which
dates back to more than forty years ago. On the other hand, for Black and Indian
natives the effect is, at worst, zero.
The findings about the group of Pakistanis & Bangladeshi are intriguing, because
it appears that this group is suffering a penalty as a consequence of using infor-
mal network. One potential explanation related to the prediction of the model
outlined in Section 4.3 is that the use of informal networks is detrimental to cul-
tural assimilation and hence to formal methods of job search. This is a plausible
explanation for both Pakistanis & Bangladeshi, as these two groups are notori-
ously more secluded and isolated than others. It is however strange that there
is no effect for females; one possible explanation is that, due to cultural reasons
and religious practices, females of this ethnic group do not actively participate
in job search, as this activity is completely carried out by men.
Finally, an interesting result emerges from the analysis of Whites. There is no
appreciable economic impact for UK-born individuals, which somewhat confirms
previous results that were found for the aggregate group (Patacchini and Zenou,
2008). For immigrants, however, and especially for women, the positive impact
of informal methods on employment outcomes is substantial. This is a new re-
sult and indicates that even for white immigrants - who should be more likely to
integrate in the culture of Britain than other groups - the use of informal con-
tacts is important. However, two aspects need to be discussed: first of all, there
is a lot of heterogeneity within the group of White immigrants, that could not
be disentangled given the available data. Second, the analysis in this Chapter
refers to the period between 1991 and 2001; in more recent years the patterns of
White immigrations have substantially changed, with a progressive decrease of
immigrants coming from more traditional sources such as Ireland, and an expo-
nential increase from the East European countries. Data available in the future
will hopefully help analysing the same research question for more detailed groups
of White immigrants.
Another important point of discussion is about the research question that this
Chapter answers. Higher probability of obtaining a job does not necessarily im-
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ply that labour market performance of an individual has improved. For certain
groups, living in an “encapsulated” economy such as an enclave provides a form
of insurance against discrimination. However, the scarce exposure to local cul-
ture might, in the long run, harm the outcomes of the individual (Borjas, 2000).
To address this question, one would need to follow over time the outcomes of
individuals who live in an enclave. An indirect way to assess if informal job
methods are harmful for the long-run economic status of individuals, is to look
at the change in the occupational structure. Friends and relatives could be an
important source for finding a better job; however, relying heavily on this source
decreases the effort put on more formal (and successful) methods of search. To
test this hypothesis, equation 4.5 has been re-estimated using the (change in the)
fraction of individuals that work in the top two occupations as outcome variable.
Results are presented in Table 4.5.
Table 4.5: IV estimates on probability of working in top two occupations
Males Females Males Females
UK-born F-born UK-born F-born UK-born F-born UK-born F-born
Blacks Indians
P ⋆ 0.875* 0.098 –0.361 1.692*** 0.255 –0.316 0.058 0.069
(0.466) (0.477) (0.551) (0.441) (0.492) (0.264) (0.460) (0.231)
N 85 101 74 95 76 137 70 125
Pakistanis and Bangladeshi Whites
P ⋆ –0.907 0.005 –1.666 0.171 0.013 0.514** –0.150** 0.014
(0.718) (0.478) (1.089) (0.297) (0.092) (0.261) (0.069) (0.170)
N 72 109 59 90 233 178 233 188
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ significant at 1%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗ significant at
10%. The reported coefficient refers to the network measure P ⋆ as instrumented by the change in the
country-specific population stocks between 1980 and 1990 and the distance from the closest port of
entry. Models are weighted by the population of each ethnic group in the LAD. The Wald statistic
refers to the test for weak identification of the instruments. The Sargan statistic refers to the test for
overidentifying restrictions.
As can be seen, in the majority of cases the coefficient is positive and, for some
groups such as immigrant Black women, the impact is quite substantial. When
the estimate has a negative value, the magnitude of the coefficient is not very
large, and is significant only in the case of UK-born White females. In this case,
an increase by 1% in P ⋆ will lead to a decrease of less than 0.15% in the prob-
ability of working in the top two occupations. Although this analysis is very
simplistic and not comprehensive, it is indicative of the fact that informal net-
works are not detrimental even in the long run. A more thorough analysis would
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be required to look at some indicators such as wage growth. This will be possible
when the availability of survey data at local level would be sufficient to perform
a robust econometric analysis of wages at local level by ethnic group.
The analysis of this Chapter could be potentially improved by constructing a
better measure to capture local interactions. This could be done by using very
fine partition of a neighborhood (Patrick et al., 2008). In England and Wales
this could be done by using Lower Level Super Output areas (which have 1,500
inhabitants on average) or even Output Areas (about 100 inhabitants on aver-
age). There are currently two obstacles that impede this: first, this particular
geography is only available after 2001 Census, and hence it cannot be compared
over time. Second, most of the cells for ethnic groups will be adjusted due to
confidentiality reasons; this creates measurement error in the regressor and the
magnitude and direction of the bias is difficult to predict (Williamson, 2007).
Another important aspect of P ⋆ is that it is measured for the aggregate ethnic
group. This means that the networks for UK-born and immigrants overlap. Since
ties are particularly strong along ethnic lines, this was a plausible assumption
that was used in the analysis. However, it would be interesting to investigate the
extent to which these groups use a more “specialised” network. For example, it
could be that UK-born ethnic groups, because of their exposure to the culture
and to the educational system of the country, use the more “skilled/educated”
part of the network, while immigrants use the more “unskilled”. Unfortunately,
data available in this research do not allow to test this question. In addition, it
is plausible to think that some ethnic groups interact with each other and hence
another interesting question would be to look at cross-ethnic interactions. This
is a research question that has not had much attention so far.
Hopefully, the availability of data from the forthcoming Census, along with a
richer amount and quality of survey data, will make it possible to explore these
interesting questions. Ideally, data should provide detailed information about
how individuals find jobs, their use of formal methodologies, their individual
network and, of course, a greater detail about the immigrant “generation”. Cur-
rently, data to study assimilation of immigrants in Britain are very limited and
information about parental characteristics of individuals are mostly absent in
survey data54. As a consequence, the investigation of how human capital is
transmitted across generations is difficult and this hinders the understanding of
the mechanisms of assimilation.
54The exception would be the Longitudinal Studies, that links four Censuses, but has limited
amount of information about economic outcomes and the pilot project launched in the LFS in
2008 to collect information about parental country of birth.
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Appendix
Figure 4.2: Wards and pertinent LADs in England and Wales (inset: London)
Digitalised boundaries from UKBorders (http://borders.edina.ac.uk/)
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Conclusion
The essays contained in this thesis have investigated unsolved research ques-
tions about the relationships of migration and the labour markets.
The results from the first Chapter show that minimum wage is an important
asset for low wage earners. The mechanisms through which immigrants choose
to move to the country have been outlined by the means of a model that en-
capsulates the effects of the minimum wage in terms of wage and employment
change. In general, these effects move in opposite direction, and hence the overall
impact of the policy is ambiguous. In the period under analysis, however, the
USA minimum wage did not hinder employment opportunities but, if anything,
increased them. Hence, immigrants found it convenient to exploit the gains gen-
erated by the policy. One implication of these results is that markets are not
perfectly competitive and hence there is room for policies such as the minimum
wage without harming employment. In implementing this institution, however,
the results of the analysis suggest that policy makers should take into account
that low-wage immigrants react to small changes in the expected wages and they
are thus likely to immigrate. In general, the results of the analysis corrobo-
rate the findings that international flows are particularly responsive to welfare
magnets (Borjas, 1999). Due to the increase in the number of States setting a
wage higher than the federal, an interesting extension of this study could be the
analysis of state-based policy. Another important question would be to test the
predictions of the model in the context of countries with different labour market
structures, such as France, where the minimum wage is relatively high.
The analysis from the second Chapter reveals that flows of recent immigrants to
England and Wales are complementary to the movements of UK-born individu-
als, while they “displace” earlier cohort of immigrants. These results corroborate
and update previous findings about the negligible impact of migration in the UK
labour market (Dustmann et al., 2005) and are a corollary to the imperfect sub-
stitutability in production between immigrants and natives (Manacorda et al.,
2008). One of the most interesting discovery of this research is that the magni-
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tude of displacement is very heterogeneous across skill groups, country of birth
and local labour markets. For example, low-skilled earlier immigrants suffer the
highest penalties in terms of displacement, and this could be ascribed to the fact
that they are more likely to have skills similar to recent immigrants. Moreover,
the impact of displacement is larger within than across regions. The results of
this research contrast with previous findings of displacement Hatton and Tani
(2005). The Chapter has documented that this divergence is attributable to the
fact that Hatton and Tani (2005) considered flows aggregated at regional level
and without skill breakdown. One interesting extension of this work is to analyse
more in details the dynamics of displacement for earlier immigrants. Ideally, one
would need detailed data by country of birth, which could be used to understand
if patterns of displacement have changed after the enlargement of the European
Union.
The empirical analysis contained in the third Chapter has shown that living in
an enclave is not detrimental to the probability of being employed. Perhaps the
most striking result, however, is that the impact varies substantially across eth-
nic groups, gender and country of birth, which might suggest that the level of
cultural assimilation of these group is different. This work could be extended
along several dimensions, all of which require more detailed data than those
available. First of all, an analysis of outcomes such as wages will help addressing
the question if living in an enclave is detrimental in other aspects of the eco-
nomic performance of individuals. Second, information about year of arrival of
immigrants and on the parental country of birth of individuals will improve the
understanding of the role played by the enclave in the labour market assimilation
of its members.
109
Bibliography
Bartel, A. (1989). Where do the New US immigrants Live? Journal of Labor
Economics 7 (4), 371–391.
Basu, B. (1995). Minimum Wage, International Migration and Their Effects on
Welfare. International Economic Journal 9 (2), 101–120.
Borjas, G. (1999). Immigration and Welfare Magnets. Journal of Labor Eco-
nomics 17 (4), 607–637.
Borjas, G. (2000). Ethnic Enclaves and Assimilation. Swedish Economic Policy
Review 7 (2), 89–122.
Borjas, G. (2003). The Labor Demand Curve is Downward Sloping: Reexam-
ining the Impact of Immigration on the Labor Market. Quarterly Journal of
Economics 118 (4), 1335–1374.
Borjas, G. (2006). Native Internal Migration and the Labor Market Impact of
Immigration. Journal of Human Resources 41 (2), 221–258.
Brown, C. (1999). Minimum Wages, Employment, and the Distribution of In-
come. Handbook of labor economics 3, 2101–2163.
Burkhauser, R., K. Couch, and D. Wittenburg (2000). A Reassessment of the
New Economics of the Minimum Wage Literature with Monthly Data from the
Current Population Survey. Journal of Labor Economics 18 (4), 653–680.
Calvo´-Armengol, A. and M. Jackson (2004). The Effects of Social Networks on
Employment and Inequality. American Economic Review 94 (3), 426–454.
Card, D. (1992). Using Regional Variation in Wages to Measure the Effects of
the Federal Minimum Wage. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 46 (1),
22–37.
110
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Card, D. (2001). Immigrant Inflows, Native Outflows, and the Local Labor
Market Impacts of Higher Immigration. Journal of Labor Economics 19 (1),
22–64.
Card, D. and A. Krueger (1995). Myth and Measurement: The New Economics
of the Minimum Wage. Princeton University Press.
Card, D. and T. Lemieux (2001). Can Falling Supply Explain the Rising Return
to College for Younger Men? A Cohort-Based Analysis. Quarterly Journal of
Economics 116 (2), 705–746.
Card, D. and E. Lewis (2005). The Diffusion of Mexican Immigrants During the
1990s: Explanations and Impacts. NBER working paper 11552 .
Castillo-Freeman, A. and R. Freeman (1992). When the Minimum Wage Really
Bites: The Effect of the US-Level Minimum on Puerto Rico. In G. J. Bor-
jas and R. B. Freeman (Eds.), Immigration and the Work Force: Economic
Consequences for the United States and Source Areas, pp. 177–212. University
Chicago Press.
Chowdhury, M. and R. Pedace (2007). Ethnic Enclaves and Labor Markets:
An Analysis of Immigrant Outcomes in California. Contemporary Economic
Policy 25 (2), 238–249.
Clark, K. and S. Drinkwater (2002). Enclaves, Neighbourhood Effects and Em-
ployment Outcomes: Ethnic Minorities in England and Wales. Journal of
Population Economics 15 (1), 5–29.
Clark, X., T. Hatton, and J. Williamson (2002). Where do US Immigrants Come
From? Policy and Sending Country Fundamentals. NBER Working Paper
8998 .
Cortes, K. (2004). Wage Effects on Immigrants from an Increase in the Min-
imum Wage Rate: An Analysis by Immigrant Industry Concentration. IZA
Discussion Paper 1064 .
Cragg, J. and S. Donald (1993). Testing Identifiability and Specification in In-
strumental Variable Models. Econometric Theory 9 (2), 222–240.
Cutler, D. and E. Glaeser (1997). Are Ghettos Good or Bad? Quarterly Journal
of Economics 112 (3), 827–872.
111
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Damm, A. (2009). Ethnic Enclaves and Immigrant Labor Market Outcomes:
Quasi-Experimental Evidence. Journal of Labor Economics 27 (2), 281–314.
Duke-Williams, O. and J. Stillwell (2007). Investigating the Potential Effects of
Small Cell Adjustment on Interaction Data from the 2001 Census. Environ-
ment and Planning A 39 (5), 1079–1100.
Dustmann, C., F. Fabbri, and I. Preston (2005). The Impact of Immigration on
the British Labour Market. Economic Journal 115 (507), F324–F341.
Dustmann, C., F. Fabbri, I. Preston, and J. Wadsworth (2003). The Local Labour
Market Effects of Migration in the UK. Home Office Online Report 06/03 .
Edin, P., P. Fredriksson, and O. Aslund (2003). Ethnic Enclaves and the Eco-
nomic Success of Immigrants - Evidence from a Natural Experiment. Quarterly
Journal of Economics 118 (1), 329–357.
Filer, R. (1992). The Effect of Immigrant Arrivals on Migratory Patterns of
Native Workers. In G. J. Borjas and R. B. Freeman (Eds.), Immigration and
the Work Force: Economic Consequences for the United States and Source
Areas, pp. 245–269. University Chicago Press.
Georgiadis, A. and A. Manning (2009). Change and Continuity Among Minority
Communities in Britain. CEP Discussion Paper 903 .
Harris, J. and M. Todaro (1970). Migration, Unemployment and Development:
A Two-sector Analysis. The American Economic Review 60 (1), 126–142.
Hatton, T. and M. Tani (2005). Immigration and Inter-regional Mobility in the
UK, 1982-2000. Economic Journal 115 (507), F342–F358.
Lemos, S. and J. Portes (2008). New Labour? The Impact of Migration from
Central and Eastern European Countries on the UK Labour Market. IZA
Discussion Paper 3756 .
Manacorda, M., A. Manning, and J. Wadsworth (2008). The Impact of Immi-
gration on the Structure of Male Wages: Theory and Evidence from Britain.
CReAM Discussion Paper 08/06 .
Manning, A. (2003). Monopsony in Motion: Imperfect Competition in Labor
Markets. Princeton University Press.
Manning, A. and S. Roy (2007). Culture Clash or Culture Club? The Identity
and Attitudes of Immigrants in Britain. CEP Discussion Paper 790 .
112
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Massey, D. and N. Denton (1988). The Dimensions of Residential Segregation.
Social forces 67 (2), 281–315.
Mayda, A. (2005). International Migration: A Panel Data Analysis of Economic
and Non-economic Determinants. IZA Discussion Paper 1590 .
Mincer, J. (1976). Unemployment Effects of Minimum Wages. The Journal of
Political Economy 84 (4), 87–104.
Neumark, D. and W. Wascher (1992). Employment Effects of Minimum and
Subminimum Wages: Panel Data on State Minimum Wage Laws. Industrial
and Labor Relations Review 46 (1), 55–81.
Neumark, D. and W. Wascher (2006). Minimum Wages and Employment: A
Review of Evidence from the New Minimum Wage Research. NBER working
paper 12663 .
Ottaviano, G. and G. Peri (2006a). Rethinking the Effects of Immigration on
Wages. NBER working paper 12497 .
Ottaviano, G. and G. Peri (2006b). The Economic Value of Cultural Diversity:
Evidence from US Cities. Journal of Economic Geography 6 (1), 9–44.
Patacchini, E. and Y. Zenou (2008). Ethnic Networks and Employment Out-
comes. IZA Discussion Papers 3331 .
Patrick, B., S. Ross, and G. Topa (2008). Place of Work and Place of Residence:
Informal Hiring Networks and Labor Market Outcomes. Journal of Political
Economy 116 (6), 1150–1196.
Raymer, J., P. Smith, and C. Giulietti (2008). Combining Census and Regis-
tration Data to Analyse Ethnic Migration Patterns in England from 1991 to
2007. S3RI Methodology Working Papers, M08/09 .
Rees, A. (1966). Information Networks in Labor Markets. The American Eco-
nomic Review 56 (1), 559–566.
Shea, J. (1997). Instrument Relevance in Multivariate Linear Models: A Simple
Measure. Review of Economics and Statistics 79 (2), 348–352.
Sparber, C. and G. Peri (2007). Task Specialization, Comparative Advantages,
and the Effects of Immigration on Wages. NBER Working Paper 13389 .
113
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Stigler, G. (1946). The Economics of Minimum Wage Legislation. The American
Economic Review 36 (3), 358–365.
Stillman, S. and D. Mare´ (2007). The Impact of Immigration on the Geographic
Mobility of New Zealanders. CReAM Discussion Paper 14/07 .
Stillwell, J. and O. Duke-Williams (2005). Ethnic Population Distribution, Im-
migration and Internal Migration in Britain: What Evidence of Linkage at
the District Scale? British Society for Population Studies Annual Conference,
University of Kent at Canterbury .
Topa, G. (2001). Social Interactions, Local Spillovers and Unemployment. The
Review of Economic Studies 68 (2), 261–295.
Wahba, J. and Y. Zenou (2005). Density, Social Networks and Job Search
Methods: Theory and Application to Egypt. Journal of Development Eco-
nomics 78 (2), 443–473.
Warman, C. (2007). Ethnic Enclaves and Immigrant Earnings Growth. Canadian
Journal of Economics 40 (2), 401–422.
Welch, F. (1974). Minimum Wage Legislation in the United States. Economic
Inquiry 12 (3), 285–318.
Welch, F. (1999). In Defense of Inequality. The American Economic Re-
view 89 (2), 1–17.
Williamson, P. (2007). The Impact of Cell Adjustment on the Analysis of Ag-
gregate Census Data. Environment and Planning A 39 (5), 1058–1078.
114
